Acta Analytica

, Volume 25, Issue 4, pp 369–391

Concepts and Perceptual Belief: How (Not) to Defend Recognitional Concepts


DOI: 10.1007/s12136-010-0092-y

Cite this article as:
Rives, B. Acta Anal (2010) 25: 369. doi:10.1007/s12136-010-0092-y


Recognitional concepts have the following characteristic property: thinkers are disposed to apply them to objects merely on the basis of undergoing certain perceptual experiences. I argue that a prominent strategy for defending the existence of constitutive connections among concepts, which appeals to thinkers’ semantic-cum-conceptual intuitions, cannot be used to defend the existence of recognitional concepts. I then outline and defend an alternative argument for the existence of recognitional concepts, which appeals to certain psychological laws.


ConceptsPerceptionRecognitional conceptsConcept atomismConceptual role semantics

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy DepartmentIndiana University of PennsylvaniaIndianaUSA