Acta Analytica

, Volume 25, Issue 4, pp 369–391

Concepts and Perceptual Belief: How (Not) to Defend Recognitional Concepts

Authors

    • Philosophy DepartmentIndiana University of Pennsylvania
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s12136-010-0092-y

Cite this article as:
Rives, B. Acta Anal (2010) 25: 369. doi:10.1007/s12136-010-0092-y

Abstract

Recognitional concepts have the following characteristic property: thinkers are disposed to apply them to objects merely on the basis of undergoing certain perceptual experiences. I argue that a prominent strategy for defending the existence of constitutive connections among concepts, which appeals to thinkers’ semantic-cum-conceptual intuitions, cannot be used to defend the existence of recognitional concepts. I then outline and defend an alternative argument for the existence of recognitional concepts, which appeals to certain psychological laws.

Keywords

Concepts Perception Recognitional concepts Concept atomism Conceptual role semantics

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010