The Propositions We Assert
- Stavroula Glezakos
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According to Scott Soames, proper names have no descriptive meaning. Nonetheless, Soames maintains that proper names are typically used to make descriptive assertions. In this paper, I challenge Soames’ division between meaning and what is asserted, first by arguing that competent speakers always make descriptive assertions with name-containing sentences, and then by defending an account of proper name meaning that accommodates this fact.
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- The Propositions We Assert
Volume 26, Issue 2 , pp 165-173
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- Springer Netherlands
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- Proper names
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Philosophy Department, Wake Forest University, Tribble Hall, B301, Winston-Salem, NC, 27109, USA