Reliabilist Justification: Basic, Easy, and Brute Authors
First Online: 23 June 2009 Received: 16 December 2008 Accepted: 01 June 2009 DOI:
Cite this article as: Kallestrup, J. Acta Anal (2009) 24: 155. doi:10.1007/s12136-009-0053-5 Abstract
Process reliabilists hold that in order for a belief to be justified, it must result from a reliable cognitive process. They also hold that a belief can be basically justified: justified in this manner without having any justification to believe that belief is reliably produced. Fumerton (1995), Vogel (2000), and Cohen (2002) have objected that such basic justification leads to implausible easy justification by means of either epistemic closure principles or so-called track record arguments. I argue that once we carefully distinguish closure principles from transmission principles, and epistemic consequences from epistemic preconditions, neither version of this objection succeeds.
Keywords Reliabilism Easy justification Closure principles Fumerton Vogel Cohen References
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