Analyticity and the Analysis Relation
- Dennis Earl
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Quine famously argued that analyticity is indefinable, since there is no good account of analyticity in terms of synonymy, and intensions are of no help since there are no intensions. Yet if there are intensions, the question still remains as to the right account of analyticity in terms of them. On the assumption that intensions must be admitted, the present paper considers two such accounts. The first analyzes analyticity in terms of concept identity, and the second analyzes analyticity in terms of the analysis relation. The first fails in light of possible counterexamples. The second is defended, both by considering test cases of intuitively clear analyticities, and by developing the account in light of possible counterexamples.
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- Analyticity and the Analysis Relation
Volume 24, Issue 2 , pp 139-148
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
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- Conceptual analysis
- Dennis Earl (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Coastal Carolina University, P.O. Box 261954, Conway, SC, 29526, USA