Acta Analytica

, Volume 24, Issue 1, pp 33–42

Speaking of Flux

Authors

    • Department of PhilosophyQueen’s University at Kingston
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s12136-008-0043-z

Cite this article as:
Han, X. Acta Anal (2009) 24: 33. doi:10.1007/s12136-008-0043-z

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to explain how the Heraclitean doctrine of universal flux must be rejected, while the notion of flux should and can be preserved. Against the reductionist account of subjectless change, a modern version of the Heraclitean doctrine advocated by revisionist metaphysics, I argue that (1) the idea of subjectless change is one that can and should be formulated in the established conceptual framework, and (2) subjectlessness is a feature that most aptly characterizes material changes. In essence, I seek to provide a proper accommodation for the notion of flux in a conceptual framework that is traditionally understood (or rather misunderstood) as decidedly excluding it.

Keywords

FluxSubjectless changeProcessEvent theoryConceptual schemeReductionism

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008