A Warranted-assertability Defense of a Moorean Response to Skepticism
- Tim Black
- … show all 1 hide
Purchase on Springer.com
$39.95 / €34.95 / £29.95*
Rent the article at a discountRent now
* Final gross prices may vary according to local VAT.
According to a Moorean response to skepticism, the standards for knowledge are invariantly comparatively low, and we can know across contexts all that we ordinarily take ourselves to know. It is incumbent upon the Moorean to defend his position by explaining how, in contexts in which S seems to lack knowledge, S can nevertheless have knowledge. The explanation proposed here relies on a warranted-assertability maneuver: Because we are warranted in asserting that S doesn’t know that p, it can seem that S does in fact lack that piece of knowledge. Moreover, this warranted-assertability maneuver is unique and better than similar maneuvers because it makes use of H. P. Grice’s general conversational rule of Quantity—“Do not make your contribution more informative than is required”—in explaining why we are warranted in asserting that S doesn’t know that p.
- Bach, K. (2005). The emperor’s new ‘knows’. In G. Preyer & G. Peter (Eds.), Contextualism in philosophy: On epistemology, language and truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Blaauw, M. (2003). WAMming away at contextualism. Sats - Nordic Journal of Philosophy, 4, 88–97.
- Black, T. (2002). A Moorean response to brain-in-a-vat scepticism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 80, 148–163. CrossRef
- Black, T. (2005). Classic invariantism, relevance, and warranted assertability manœuvers. The Philosophical Quarterly, 55, 328–336. CrossRef
- Black, T. (2008). Defending a sensitive neo-Moorean invariantism. In V. F. Hendricks & D. Pritchard (Eds.), New waves in epistemology (pp. 8–27). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Black, T., & Murphy, P. (2005). Avoiding the dogmatic commitments of contextualism. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 69, 165–182.
- Brown, J. (2005). Adapt or die: The death of invariantism? The Philosophical Quarterly, 55, 263–285. CrossRef
- Brown, J. (2006). Contextualism and warranted assertability manoeuvres. Philosophical Studies, 130, 407–435. CrossRef
- Carston, R. (1998). Informativeness, relevance and scalar implicature. In R. Carston & S. Uchida (Eds.), Relevance theory: Applications and implications. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- Cohen, S. (1988). How to be a fallibilist. Philosophical Perspectives, 2, 91–123. CrossRef
- Cohen, S. (1999). Contextualism, skepticism, and the structure of reasons. Philosophical Perspectives, 13, 57–89.
- DeRose, K. (1991). Epistemic possibilities. Philosophical Review, 100, 581–605. CrossRef
- DeRose, K. (1992). Contextualism and knowledge attributions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 52, 913–929. CrossRef
- DeRose, K. (1996). Knowledge, assertion, and lotteries. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74, 568–580. CrossRef
- DeRose, K. (1999a). Contextualism: An explanation and defense. In J. Greco & E. Sosa (Eds.), The Blackwell guide to epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell.
- DeRose, K. (1999b). Now you know it, now you don’t. In Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume V, Epistemology. Bowling Green, OH: Philosophy Documentation Center.
- DeRose, K. (1999c). Solving the skeptical problem. In K. DeRose & T. A. Warfield (Eds.), Skepticism: A contemporary reader. New York: Oxford University Press.
- DeRose, K. (2002). Assertion, knowledge, and context. Philosophical Review, 111, 167–203.
- DeRose, K. (2006). “Bamboozled by our own words”: Semantic blindness and some arguments against contextualism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 73, 316–338. CrossRef
- Grice, H. P. (1989a). Logic and conversation. In H. P. Grice (Eds.), Studies in the way of words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Grice, H. P. (1989b). Meaning. In H. P. Grice (Eds.), Studies in the way of words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Harnish, R. M. (1976). Logical form and implicature. In T. G. Bever, J. J. Katz & D. T. Langendoen (Eds.), An integrated theory of linguistic ability. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell.
- Hawthorne, J. (2001). Freedom in context. Philosophical Studies, 104, 63–79. CrossRef
- Heller, M. (1999). Relevant alternatives and closure. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 77, 196–208. CrossRef
- Hirschberg, J. (1985). A theory of scalar implicature. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania.
- Horn, L. R. (1984). Toward a new taxonomy for pragmatic inference: Q-based and R-based implicature. In D. Schiffrin (Eds.), Meaning, form, and use in context: Linguistic applications. Washington, D. C.: Georgetown University Press.
- Leech, G. N. (1983). Principles of pragmatics. New York: Longman.
- Leite, A. (2005). Some worries for would-be WAMmers. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 69, 101–125.
- Levinson, S. C. (1983). Pragmatics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Levinson, S. C. (2000). Presumptive meanings: The theory of generalized conversational implicature. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Lewis, D. (1996). Elusive knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74, 549–567. CrossRef
- Nozick, R. (1981). Philosophical explanations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- O’Hair, S. G. (1969). Implications and meaning. Theoria, 35, 38–54. CrossRef
- Pritchard, D. (2005). Contextualism, scepticism and warranted assertibility manoeuvres. In J. Keim-Campbell, M. O’Rourke, & H. Silverstein (Eds.), Knowledge and skepticism. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Rieber, S. (1998). Skepticism and contrastive explanation. Noûs, 32, 189–204.
- Rysiew, P. (2001). The context-sensitivity of knowledge attributions. Noûs, 35, 477–514.
- Sperber, D., & Wilson, D. (1986). Relevance: Communication and cognition. Oxford: Basil, Blackwell.
- Unger, P. (1975). Ignorance: A case for scepticism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Van Rooy, R. (2004). Relevance implicatures. Retrieved November 3, 2007, from http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/545416.html.
- Welker, K. (1994). Plans in the common ground: Toward a generative account of implicature. Ph.D. Dissertation, The Ohio State University.
- Williamson, T. (1996). Knowing and asserting. Philosophical Review, 105, 489–523. CrossRef
- Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and its limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- A Warranted-assertability Defense of a Moorean Response to Skepticism
Volume 23, Issue 3 , pp 187-205
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
- Additional Links
- Tim Black (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Philosophy, California State University, 18111 Nordhoff Street, Northridge, CA, 91330–8253, USA