Acta Analytica

, Volume 23, Issue 2, pp 161-176

First online:

A Critique of Armstrong’s Truthmaking Account of Possibility

  • Javier KalhatAffiliated withPhilosophisches Seminar, Universität Zürich Email author 

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In this paper I argue against Armstrong’s recent truthmaking account of possibility. I show that the truthmaking account presupposes modality in a number of different ways, and consequently that it is incapable of underwriting a genuine reduction of modality. I also argue that Armstrong’s account faces serious difficulties irrespective of the question of reduction; in particular, I argue that his Entailment and Possibility Principles are both false.


Armstrong Truthmakers Possibility Reduction Instantiation Combinatorialism