A Critique of Armstrong’s Truthmaking Account of Possibility
- Javier Kalhat
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In this paper I argue against Armstrong’s recent truthmaking account of possibility. I show that the truthmaking account presupposes modality in a number of different ways, and consequently that it is incapable of underwriting a genuine reduction of modality. I also argue that Armstrong’s account faces serious difficulties irrespective of the question of reduction; in particular, I argue that his Entailment and Possibility Principles are both false.
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- A Critique of Armstrong’s Truthmaking Account of Possibility
Volume 23, Issue 2 , pp 161-176
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- Javier Kalhat (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Philosophisches Seminar, Universität Zürich, Zürichbergstrasse 43, 8044, Zürich, Switzerland