Epistemic Risk and Relativism
- Wayne D. Riggs
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It is generally assumed that there are (at least) two fundamental epistemic goals: believing truths, and avoiding the acceptance of falsehoods. As has been often noted, these goals are in conflict with one another. Moreover, the norms governing rational belief that we should derive from these two goals depend on how we weight them relative to one another. However, it is not obvious that there is one objectively correct weighting for everyone in all circumstances. Indeed, as I shall argue, it looks as though there are circumstances in which a range of possible weightings of the two goals are all equally epistemically rational.
- James, W. (1969). The moral philosophy of William James. New York: The Thomas Y. Crowell Co.
- Riggs, W. (2003). Balancing our epistemic ends. Noûs, 37.
- Epistemic Risk and Relativism
Volume 23, Issue 1 , pp 1-8
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- Springer Netherlands
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- Theory of knowledge
- Wayne D. Riggs (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. University of Oklahoma, 455 W. Lindsey, Room 605, Norman, OK, 73019, USA