Acta Analytica

, Volume 20, Issue 2, pp 38–55

Why contextualists cannot know they are right: Self-refuting implications of contextualism

  • Elke Brendel
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s12136-005-1021-3

Cite this article as:
Brendel, E. Acta Anal (2005) 20: 38. doi:10.1007/s12136-005-1021-3

Abstract

Conversational contextualism in epistemology is characterized by four main theses: 1. the indexicality of knowledge claims thesis; 2. the attributor contextualism thesis; 3. the conversational contextualism thesis, and 4. the main thesis of contextualism according to which a knowledge claim can be true in one context and false in another context in which more stringent standards for knowledge are operant. It is argued that these theses taken together generate problems for contextualism. In particular, it is shown that there is no context in which the contextualist can truthfully claim to know her theory is true. Since these results were obtained only with principles the contextualist cannot give up—like the principle of epistemic closure and the principle that knowledge implies truth—it seems that contextualism is in need of a thoroughgoing revision if it is to become a successful epistemic theory.

Keywords

conversational contextualism attributor contextualism epistemic closure indexicality of knowledge skepticism 

Copyright information

© Springer 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Elke Brendel
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyJohannes Gutenberg-University MainzMainzGermany