Acta Analytica

, Volume 20, Issue 1, pp 29–42

Contextualist theories of knowledge

  • Wayne A. Davis
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s12136-005-1002-6

Cite this article as:
Davis, W.A. Acta Anal (2005) 20: 29. doi:10.1007/s12136-005-1002-6

Abstract

Contextualist theories of knowledge offer a semantic hypothesis to explain the observed contextual variation in what people say they know, and the difficulty people have resolving skeptical paradoxes. Subject or speaker relative versions make the truth conditions of “S knows that p” depend on the standards of either the knower’s context (Hawthorne and Stanley) or those of the speaker’s context (Cohen and DeRose). Speaker contextualism avoids objections to subject contextualism, but is implausible in light of evidence that “know” does not behave like an indexical. I deepen and extend these criticisms in light of recent defenses by contextualists (including Ludlow). Another difficulty is that whether certain standards are salient or intended does not entail that they are the proper standards. A normative form of contextualism on which the truth of a knowledge claim depends on the proper standards for the context is more promising, but still unsatisfactory whether the view is speaker or subject relative. I defend alternative explanations for the observed linguistic and psychological data: a pragmatic account for some cases and a cognitive account for others.1

Keywords

contextualismepistemologyindexicalsnormativitypragmaticsskeptical paradoxes

Copyright information

© Springer 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Wayne A. Davis
    • 1
  1. 1.Philosophy DepartmentGeorgetown UniversityWashington, DCUSA