Relational properties, causal powers and psychological laws
- Sean Crawford
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This paper argues that Twin Earth twins belong to the same psychological natural kind, but that the reason for this is not that the causal powers of mental states supervene on local neural structure. Fodor’s argument for this latter thesis is criticized and found to rest on a confusion between it and the claim that Putnamian and Burgean type relational psychological properties do not affect the causal powers of the mental states that have them. While it is true that Putnamian and Burgean type relational psychological properties do not affect causal powers, it is false that no relational psychological properties do. Examples of relational psychological properties that do affect causal powers are given and psychological laws are sketched that subsume twins in virtue of them instantiating these relational properties rather than them sharing the narrow contents of their thoughts.
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- Relational properties, causal powers and psychological laws
Volume 18, Issue 30-31 , pp 193-216
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- relational properties
- causal powers
- psychological laws
- Twin Earth
- narrow content
- Sean Crawford (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Philosophy, The Open University, MK7 6AA, Milton Keynes, UK