Acta Analytica

, Volume 18, Issue 1, pp 177–191

The new mysterianism and the thesis of cognitive closure

  • Uriah Kriegel
Philosophy Of Mind

DOI: 10.1007/s12136-003-1020-1

Cite this article as:
Kriegel, U. Acta Anal (2003) 18: 177. doi:10.1007/s12136-003-1020-1


The paper discusses Colin McGinn’s mysterianist approach to the phenomenon of consciousness. According to McGinn, consciousness is, in and of itself, a fully natural phenomenon, but we humans are just cognitively closed to it, meaning that we cannot in principle understand its nature. I argue that, on a proper conception of the relation between an intellectual problem and its solution, we may well not know what the solution is to a problem we understand, or we may not understand exactly what the problem is, but it is incoherent to suppose that we cannot understand what would count as a solution to a problem we can and do understand. The argument appeals to certain accepted assumption in the logic of questions, developed in the early sixties, mainly by Stahl. I close with a general characterization of mysterianism as such, and formulate a form of mysterianism which is in some sense more optimistic and in another more pessimistic than McGinn’s.


consciousness mysterianism cognitive closure logic of questions explanatory gap 

Copyright information

© Springer 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Uriah Kriegel
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of ArizonaTucsonUSA

Personalised recommendations