In Defence of Powerful Qualities
- John H. Taylor
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The ontology of ‘powerful qualities’ is gaining an increasing amount of attention in the literature on properties. This is the view that the so-called categorical or qualitative properties are identical with ‘dispositional’ properties. The position is associated with C.B. Martin, John Heil, Galen Strawson and Jonathan Jacobs. Robert Schroer (2012) has recently mounted a number of criticisms against the powerful qualities view as conceived by these main adherents, and has also advanced his own (radically different) version of the view. In this paper I have three main aims: firstly, I shall defend the ontology from his critique, arguing that his criticisms do not damage the position. Secondly, I shall argue that Schroer’s own version of the view is untenable. Thirdly, the paper shall serve to clear up some conceptual confusions that often bedevil the powerful qualities view.
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- In Defence of Powerful Qualities
Volume 14, Issue 1 , pp 93-107
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
- Additional Links
- Powerful qualities
- Categorical properties
- Dispositional properties
- Partial consideration
- Phenomenal consciousness
- John H. Taylor (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Philosophy, University of Durham, Durham, DH1 3HN, UK