Why so Serious? Non-serious Presentism and the Problem of Cross-temporal Relations
- Ross Inman
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It is a common assumption in the metaphysics of time that a commitment to presentism entails a commitment to serious presentism, the view that objects can exemplify properties or stand in relations only at times at which they exist. As a result, non-serious presentism is widely thought to be beyond the bounds for the card-carrying presentist in response to the problem of cross-temporal relations. In this paper, I challenge this general consensus by examining one common argument in favor of the thesis that presentism entails serious presentism. The argument, I claim, begs the question against non-serious defenders in failing to account for their wider metaontological views concerning non-committal quantification.
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- Why so Serious? Non-serious Presentism and the Problem of Cross-temporal Relations
Volume 13, Issue 1 , pp 55-63
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- Ross Inman (1)
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- 1. Department of Philosophy, Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland