Metaphysica

, Volume 13, Issue 1, pp 7–25

Russellian Propositions and Properties

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s12133-011-0089-z

Cite this article as:
Almäng, J. Int Ontology Metaphysics (2012) 13: 7. doi:10.1007/s12133-011-0089-z
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Abstract

This paper discusses a problem for Russellian propositions. According to Russellianism, each word in a sentence contributes its referent to the proposition expressed by the sentence. Russellian propositions have normally been conceived of as problematic for two reasons, viz. they cannot account for the unity of the proposition and they have problems with non-referring singular names. In this paper, I argue that Russellianism also faces a problem with respect to properties. It is inconsistent with both traditional realism and trope-theories. The only theory of properties which is consistent with Russellianism is Platonism. Moreover, it is argued that Russellianism needs a particularly implausible version of Platonism.

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Social and Behavioural StudiesUniversity WestTrollhättanSweden
  2. 2.Department of Philosophy, Linguistics and Theory of ScienceUniversity of GothenburgGothenburgSweden
  3. 3.ArvikaSweden