Russellian Propositions and Properties
- Jan Almäng
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This paper discusses a problem for Russellian propositions. According to Russellianism, each word in a sentence contributes its referent to the proposition expressed by the sentence. Russellian propositions have normally been conceived of as problematic for two reasons, viz. they cannot account for the unity of the proposition and they have problems with non-referring singular names. In this paper, I argue that Russellianism also faces a problem with respect to properties. It is inconsistent with both traditional realism and trope-theories. The only theory of properties which is consistent with Russellianism is Platonism. Moreover, it is argued that Russellianism needs a particularly implausible version of Platonism.
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- Russellian Propositions and Properties
Volume 13, Issue 1 , pp 7-25
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- Jan Almäng (1) (2) (3)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Social and Behavioural Studies, University West, Trollhättan, Sweden
- 2. Department of Philosophy, Linguistics and Theory of Science, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden
- 3. Liljebjörns v 10, 671 33, Arvika, Sweden