- Huiyuhl Yi
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The central claim of the Parfitian psychological approach to personal identity is that the fact about personal identity is underpinned by a “non-branching” psychological continuity relation. Hence, for the advocates of the Parfitian view, it is important to understand what it is for a relation to take or not take a branching form. Nonetheless, very few attempts have been made in the literature of personal identity to define the “non-branching clause.” This paper undertakes this task. Drawing upon a recent debate between Anthony Brueckner and Harold Noonan on the issue, I present three candidates for the non-branching clause.
- Brueckner, A. (1993). “Parfit on What Matters in Survival,” Philosophical Studies 70, pp. 1-20. CrossRef
- Brueckner, A. (2005). “Branching in the Psychological Approach to Personal Identity,” Analysis 65, pp. 294-301. CrossRef
- Lewis, D. (1976). “Survival and Identity,” in A. Rorty (ed.) The Identities of Persons. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 17-40.
- Noonan, H. W. (2003). Personal Identity. London: Routledge.
- Noonan, H. W. (2006). “Non-Branching and Circularity – Reply to Brueckner,” Analysis 66, pp. 163-67. CrossRef
- Parfit, D. (1971). “Personal identity,” Philosophical Review 80, pp. 3-27. CrossRef
- Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Wiggins, D. (1980). Sameness and Substance. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Non-branching Clause
Volume 11, Issue 2 , pp 191-210
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- Springer Netherlands
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- Personal identity
- Psychological approach
- Huiyuhl Yi (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology, 100 Banyeon-ri, Ulju-gun, Ulsan Metropolitan City, Republic of Korea