Article

Metaphysica

, Volume 11, Issue 2, pp 181-190

Triangles, Schemes and Worlds: Reply to Nulty

  • Julien BeillardAffiliated withDepartment of Philosophy, Ryerson University Email author 

Rent the article at a discount

Rent now

* Final gross prices may vary according to local VAT.

Get Access

Abstract

Nulty proposes a “Davidsonian” argument for metaphysical pluralism, the thesis that there are (or could be) many actual worlds, which appeals to the possibility of alien forms of triangulation. I dispute Nulty’s reading of Davidson on two important points: Davidson’s attack on the notion of a conceptual scheme is not, as Nulty thinks, directed at pluralism, and his understanding of the notions of objective truth and reality is at odds with the conception needed for Nulty’s argument. I also show that the pluralist argument fails on its own terms as it requires an assimilation of worlds to worldviews. But there is much of value in Nulty’s paper despite these important flaws. When the confusions are cleared up, we are left with an intriguing and novel line of argument for conceptual relativism.

Keywords

Davidson Metaphysical pluralism Conceptual relativism Conceptual schemes