Metaphysica

, Volume 10, Issue 2, pp 149–156

The Criterion or Criteria of Change

Authors

    • Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Manitoba
Original Paper

DOI: 10.1007/s12133-009-0046-2

Cite this article as:
Han, X. Int Ontology Metaphysics (2009) 10: 149. doi:10.1007/s12133-009-0046-2

Abstract

In this paper, I offer an examination of the two existing criteria of change, one indicated, implicitly, by Aristotle and the other proposed, quite formally, by Russell. Both criteria engender problems. While the Aristotelian criterion is both too narrow and too broad, as it includes bogus changes and excludes subjectless changes, the Russellian criterion avoids the distinction between genuine changes and bogus changes completely. The aim of the paper is to address these problems and to show how these two existing criteria of change can be made to deal with the problems through revision and integration.

Keywords

Aristotle Cambridge change Subjectless change Subject–predicate propositions Feature-placing propositions

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009