Metaphysica

, Volume 10, Issue 1, pp 89–95

Does Blackburn’s Expressivism Have a Problem with Respect to Supervenience? A Reply to Wright and Zangwill

Authors

    • Department of PhilosophyGeorgetown University
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s12133-008-0041-z

Cite this article as:
Sonderholm, J. Int Ontology Metaphysics (2009) 10: 89. doi:10.1007/s12133-008-0041-z

Abstract

This paper is concerned with the expressivist account of moral supervenience that Simon Blackburn has offered. First, the account is presented, and an objection to it is thereafter discussed. In short, the objection is that the supervenience constraint in moral discourse is mysterious, given that no similar constraint governs speech and thought in other areas of discourse that seem to be prime candidates for an expressivist analysis. The conclusion of the paper is that this objection can be fended off.

Keywords

Metaethics Expressivism Supervenience Extrinsic properties

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008