Does Blackburn’s Expressivism Have a Problem with Respect to Supervenience? A Reply to Wright and Zangwill
- Jorn Sonderholm
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This paper is concerned with the expressivist account of moral supervenience that Simon Blackburn has offered. First, the account is presented, and an objection to it is thereafter discussed. In short, the objection is that the supervenience constraint in moral discourse is mysterious, given that no similar constraint governs speech and thought in other areas of discourse that seem to be prime candidates for an expressivist analysis. The conclusion of the paper is that this objection can be fended off.
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- Does Blackburn’s Expressivism Have a Problem with Respect to Supervenience? A Reply to Wright and Zangwill
Volume 10, Issue 1 , pp 89-95
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- Springer Netherlands
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- Extrinsic properties
- Jorn Sonderholm (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Philosophy, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA