Can I be an Instantaneous Stage and yet Persist Through Time?
- Tobias Hansson Wahlberg
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An alternative to the standard endurance/perdurance accounts of persistence has recently been developed: the stage theory (Sider, T. Four-Dimensionalism: an Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001; Hawley, K. How Things Persist. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). According to this theory, a persisting object is identical with an instantaneous stage (temporal part). On the basis of Leibniz’s Law, I argue that stage theorists either have to deny the alleged identity (i.e., give up their central thesis) or hold that stages are both instantaneous and continuants. I subsequently show that, although stage theory is flexible enough to accommodate the latter claim, the cost for accommodating it is an excessive proliferation of persistence concepts.
- Hansson Wahlberg, T. “4-D Objects and Disposition Ascriptions”. Philosophical Papers, forthcoming.
- Hawley, K. 2001. How Things Persist. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lewis, D. 1968. “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic”. Journal of Philosophy 65: 113–26. CrossRef
- Lewis, D. 1971. “Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies”. Journal of Philosophy 68: 203–11. CrossRef
- Sider, T. 2001. Four-Dimensionalism: an Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wiggins, D. 2001. Sameness and Substance Renewed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Can I be an Instantaneous Stage and yet Persist Through Time?
Volume 9, Issue 2 , pp 235-239
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
- Additional Links
- Stage theory
- Temporal counterparts
- Leibniz’s Law
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Philosophy, Lund University, Kungshuset, 222 22, Lund, Sweden