Metaphysica

, Volume 9, Issue 2, pp 235–239

Can I be an Instantaneous Stage and yet Persist Through Time?

Original Paper

DOI: 10.1007/s12133-008-0036-9

Cite this article as:
Hansson Wahlberg, T. Int Ontology Metaphysics (2008) 9: 235. doi:10.1007/s12133-008-0036-9

Abstract

An alternative to the standard endurance/perdurance accounts of persistence has recently been developed: the stage theory (Sider, T. Four-Dimensionalism: an Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001; Hawley, K. How Things Persist. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). According to this theory, a persisting object is identical with an instantaneous stage (temporal part). On the basis of Leibniz’s Law, I argue that stage theorists either have to deny the alleged identity (i.e., give up their central thesis) or hold that stages are both instantaneous and continuants. I subsequently show that, although stage theory is flexible enough to accommodate the latter claim, the cost for accommodating it is an excessive proliferation of persistence concepts.

Keywords

PersistenceStage theoryTemporal counterpartsPredicationLeibniz’s Law

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyLund UniversityLundSweden