Original Paper

Metaphysica

, Volume 8, Issue 1, pp 17-27

Spinoza on Having a False Idea

  • Douglas LewisAffiliated withDepartment of Philosophy, University of Minnesota Email author 

Rent the article at a discount

Rent now

* Final gross prices may vary according to local VAT.

Get Access

Abstract

Naturalism pervades Spinoza’s doctrines of The Ethics, but the contours of it often bewilder us. In this light, I consider the account of falsity, or having a false idea, as presented by Spinoza in Proposition thirty_five of the Second Part, its demonstration, and the subsequent note. Based on my interpretation I argue for the claim that his account has coherence and makes sense. Further, I examine the significance of what Spinoza says about falsity for comprehension of his philosophy overall, especially as regards its contrasts with the philosophy of Descartes.

Keywords

Spinoza False idea Comprehension Philosophy