Spinoza on Having a False Idea
- Douglas Lewis
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Naturalism pervades Spinoza’s doctrines of The Ethics, but the contours of it often bewilder us. In this light, I consider the account of falsity, or having a false idea, as presented by Spinoza in Proposition thirty_five of the Second Part, its demonstration, and the subsequent note. Based on my interpretation I argue for the claim that his account has coherence and makes sense. Further, I examine the significance of what Spinoza says about falsity for comprehension of his philosophy overall, especially as regards its contrasts with the philosophy of Descartes.
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- Spinoza on Having a False Idea
Volume 8, Issue 1 , pp 17-27
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- Kluwer Academic Publishers
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- Douglas Lewis (1)
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- 1. Department of Philosophy, University of Minnesota, 831 Heller Hall, 271 19th Avenue South, Minneapolis, MN, 55414, USA