, Volume 8, Issue 1, pp 17–27

Spinoza on Having a False Idea

Original Paper

DOI: 10.1007/s12133-007-0002-y

Cite this article as:
Lewis, D. Int Ontology Metaphysics (2007) 8: 17. doi:10.1007/s12133-007-0002-y


Naturalism pervades Spinoza’s doctrines of The Ethics, but the contours of it often bewilder us. In this light, I consider the account of falsity, or having a false idea, as presented by Spinoza in Proposition thirty_five of the Second Part, its demonstration, and the subsequent note. Based on my interpretation I argue for the claim that his account has coherence and makes sense. Further, I examine the significance of what Spinoza says about falsity for comprehension of his philosophy overall, especially as regards its contrasts with the philosophy of Descartes.


SpinozaFalse ideaComprehensionPhilosophy

Copyright information

© Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of MinnesotaMinneapolisUSA