Metaphysica

, Volume 8, Issue 1, pp 17–27

Spinoza on Having a False Idea

Authors

    • Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Minnesota
Original Paper

DOI: 10.1007/s12133-007-0002-y

Cite this article as:
Lewis, D. Int Ontology Metaphysics (2007) 8: 17. doi:10.1007/s12133-007-0002-y

Abstract

Naturalism pervades Spinoza’s doctrines of The Ethics, but the contours of it often bewilder us. In this light, I consider the account of falsity, or having a false idea, as presented by Spinoza in Proposition thirty_five of the Second Part, its demonstration, and the subsequent note. Based on my interpretation I argue for the claim that his account has coherence and makes sense. Further, I examine the significance of what Spinoza says about falsity for comprehension of his philosophy overall, especially as regards its contrasts with the philosophy of Descartes.

Keywords

Spinoza False idea Comprehension Philosophy

Copyright information

© Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2007