Autocracy, Elections, and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from Malaysia

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s12116-007-9006-4

Cite this article as:
Pepinsky, T. St Comp Int Dev (2007) 42: 136. doi:10.1007/s12116-007-9006-4

Abstract

Authoritarian regimes often use fiscal policy to reward political supporters and to punish political opponents. In many authoritarian regimes with political institutions like parties, legislatures, and elections, elections become a focal point for budget expenditures and the distribution of government patronage. A time-series analysis of Malaysian fiscal expenditures from 1967 to 1997 shows that the ruling coalition systematically increases federal government spending before elections. In addition to marshalling private resources to distribute patronage, the Malaysian government manipulates the government’s official position. These findings have important implications for the growing literature on political institutions under autocratic regimes and the politics of patronage and redistribution in the developing world. They also suggest a new empirical domain for existing theories of political business cycles.

Keywords

AutocracyElectionsFiscal policyMalaysia

Copyright information

© Springer Science & Business Media, LLC 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Political ScienceUniversity of Colorado-BoulderBoulderUSA