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Why did the League of Nations fail?

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Abstract

Why did the League of Nations ultimately fail to achieve widespread disarmament, its most fundamental goal? This article shows that the failure of the League of Nations had two important dimensions: (1) the failure to provide adequate security guarantees for its members (like an alliance); (2) the failure of this organization to achieve the disarmament goals it set out in the 1920s and 1930s. Thus, it was doomed from the outset to fail, due to built-in institutional contradictions. It can also be modeled and analyzed as a potential military alliance. The results are fairly conclusive: The League of Nations did not function as a pure public-good alliance, which encouraged an arms race in the 1930s.

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Notes

  1. On this type of argument, see Rosencrance and Stein (1993), Rosencrance and Steiner (1993), e.g. 124–125. More specific tests of this argument, in relation with military spending demand and the relevant variables, are presented in the subsequent sections.

  2. For a more complete archival analysis of the negotiations and the players involved, as well as a deeper discussion of the data and sources, see Eloranta (2002b).

  3. Cf. The League of Nations Starts 1920, Appendix I (containing the 1919 Covenant) and Northedge (1986), Appendix A (containing the 1938 amended Covenant). Many of the amendments dealt with changes in the administrative structure of the League.

  4. See The League of Nations Starts 1920, 26; Appendix I.

  5. The League of Nations Starts 1920, Appendix I, Article 8.

  6. The League of Nations Starts 1920, 137–138. See also the later Temporary Mixed Commission for the Reduction of Armaments, e.g. its report in League of Nations, Assembly Documents, A. 35. 1923. IX (Part 1): August 30.

  7. The League of Nations Starts 1920, Appendix I, Article 11.

  8. The League of Nations Starts 1920, Appendix I, Article 16.

  9. The League of Nations Starts 1920, Appendix I, Article 17.

  10. The League of Nations Starts 1920, Appendix I, Article 23.

  11. See e.g. League of Nations, A. 13. 1921. IX: August 22. Reduction of National Expenditure on Armaments. Including replies from 26 governments; League of Nations, C. 90. M. 40. 1921. IX: June 7. Reduction of National Expenditure of Armaments. Including replies from 16 governments.

  12. Northedge (1986), 120–121. See also Scott (1973), e.g. 189. A good overall account of the disarmament “process” can be found in Vaïsse (1993).

  13. See e.g. League of Nations, A. 51. 1931. IX: September 11. Reduction of Armaments; League of Nations, C. 774. M. 369. 1931. IX: October 29. Voluntary Armaments Truce (Czechoslovakia’s positive reply); League of Nations, C. 627. M. 309. 1932. IX: September 5. Voluntary Armaments Truce. Replies from 6 governments (concerning the extension of the armaments truce). See also Jones (1939), 244–246.

  14. See, for example Murray (1984), Kennedy (1989), Northedge (1986).

  15. See especially Northedge (1986), Chap. 10.

  16. Includes: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Russia/USSR, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the USA.

  17. Modelski and Thompson also use somewhat scattered estimates of the Great Power naval spending to calculate world leadership shares as well as other variables. Their study is, in particular, to be commended due to its detailed explanations on the sources used and the weaknesses of the estimates. See Modelski and Thompson (1988), e.g. 38–48. Here I have chosen to define a battleship as a military capital ship other than an aircraft carrier with a tonnage of at least 15,000 tons. On concepts and theoretical challenges, see especially Modelski and Thompson (1996).

  18. When compared to the 17 states used in the previous section. However, some of the econometric calculations use a larger sample, clearly indicated, when the data is available.

  19. Other organizations can of course be studied in a similar fashion, as providing a pure public good in a fashion other than militarily. See Olson and Zeckhouser (1966), Sandler and Hartley (1999).

  20. See Sandler and Hartley (1995), 74–76, which also presents the ordinal version of this game.

  21. On the comparison between the pre-war arbitration movement and the more extensive League of Nations, see Egerton (1974).

  22. This was hardly a unanimous view held by British officials, especially those serving in the League of Nations. See Towle (1993).

  23. Spearman R assumes that the variables under consideration were measured on at least an ordinal (rank order) scale, that is, that the individual observations can be ranked into two ordered series. It is a nonparametric test, which is well suited for the analysis of small samples in particular. The null hypothesis is a zero coefficient.

  24. See Sandler and Hartley (1999), 44 and the studies listed therein. Some years in the 1980s did produce a similar pure public good impact as the yearly years of the NATO.

  25. Utilizing the modified GDP data available from Eloranta (2002b).

  26. This procedure assumes that the variables under consideration were measured on a scale that allows the rank ordering of observations based on each and that allows rank ordering of the differences between variables; i.e., it is a nonparametric test like the Spearman rank correlation test. The null hypothesis is that the two samples have the same median.

  27. Thus, essentially this tests for the responsiveness to a common price variable. Details on this series can be found in (Eloranta 2002a).

  28. Given that N > T in this samples, one should use PCSEs (Panel Corrected Standard Errors) to avoid overconfidence in the parameter estimates. See especially (Beck and Katz 1995) for details. In addition, see (Beck 2001). All the panels are unbalanced panels, which should not have an impact on the analysis given that the missing variables were not due to a sampling bias.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of History, Appalachian State University, 224 Joyce Lawrence Lane, Anne Belk Hall, Boone, NC, 28608, USA

    Jari Eloranta

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Correspondence to Jari Eloranta.

Appendices

Data appendix

1.1 Common data (1920–1938)

Data on how the 17-country system was calculated, what variables were used, and how the quasi-USD values for the individual country series were arrived at, as well as details on the data solutions for those countries other than the 11 European nations mostly used here (the actual quantitative data available from the author by request), can be found in Eloranta (2002b, 2007). Exchange rates used in various conversions from Global Financial Data (2000) (only partially for France, Germany, the UK, the USA), otherwise from Schneider et al. (1991, 1997) and Autio (1992). Data on battleships as well as nominal and depreciated tonnages were found in Modelski–Thompson (1988), complemented with data from the League of Nations (1924–1940), Armaments Year-Books and League of Nations (1923), Statistical Enquiry into National Peace-time Armaments. A.20. IX. Definitions of military expenditures can be found in Eloranta (2002b). The real European unit price of arms and armaments was taken from Eloranta (2002a).

Country-specific data: 11 European nations (1920–1938)

2.1 Belgium

Nominal ME from Clement (2000). Nominal GDP from Buyst (1997). Real GDP from Maddison (1995), adjusted according to 1929 indirect PPP-level differences calculated in Prados de la Escosura (2000). Total population from Maddison (1995). Nominal CGE from Clement (2000). Regarding price data, WPI (year 1920 missing) and CPI from Mitchell (1998), combined with equal weighting (for 1920 only CPI taken) to come up with a deflator for ME. Nominal ME was then converted to 1929 prices and adjusted with the indirect PPP converters found in Prados de la Escosura (2000) and the exchange rates mentioned earlier to come up with real ME in 1929 (quasi)-USD.

2.2 Denmark

Nominal ME and GDP from Johansen (1985). Real GDP from Maddison (1995), adjusted as in the case of Belgium. Total population from Maddison (1995). Nominal CGE from Johansen (1985). Danish WPI and CPI from Mitchell (1998), combined with equal weighting to come up with a deflator for ME. Real ME derived as in the case of Belgium.

2.3 Finland

Nominal ME from Tervasmäki (1964). Nominal GDP from Hjerppe (1988). Real GDP from Maddison (1995), adjusted as in the case of Belgium. Total population from Maddison (1995). Nominal CGE obtained from Mitchell (1998). Finnish WPI and CPI from Mitchell (1998), combined with equal weighting to come up with a deflator for ME. Real ME derived as in the case of Belgium.

2.4 France

Nominal ME from Frankenstein (1982). Nominal GDP from Mitchell (1998). Real GDP from Maddison (1995), adjusted as in the Belgian case. Total population from Maddison (1995). Nominal CGE from Mitchell (1998). French WPI from Mitchell (1998) and French CPI from Global Financial Data (2000), combined with equal weighting to come up with a deflator for ME. Real ME derived as in the case of Belgium.

2.5 The Netherlands

Nominal ME from Central Bureau voor de Statistiek (1979). Nominal GDP from Bakker et al. (1990) (1920 figure is nominal NNP from Central Bureau voor de Statistiek (1979) raised by 8.4 percent). Real GDP from Maddison (1995), adjusted as in the case of Belgium. Total population from Maddison (1995). Nominal CGE from Mitchell (1998). Dutch WPI and CPI from Mitchell (1998), combined with equal weighting to come up with a deflator for ME. Real ME derived as in the case of Belgium.

2.6 Norway

Nominal ME and GDP from Historisk Statistikk (1978). Real GDP from Maddison (1995), adjusted as in the case of Belgium. Total population from Maddison (1995). Nominal CGE from Historisk Statistikk (1978). Norwegian WPI and CPI from Mitchell (1998), combined with equal weighting to come up with a deflator for ME. Real ME derived as in the case of Belgium.

2.7 Portugal

Nominal ME and CGE from Valério (1994). Nominal GDP from Batista et al. (1997). Real GDP from Batista et al. (1997), adjusted as in the case of Belgium. Total population from Maddison (1995). Regarding price data, Portuguese WPI taken from Valério (1994) and Portuguese CPI for 1929–1938 from Mitchell (1998), combined with equal weighting (only WPI for 1920–1928) to come up with a deflator for ME. Real ME derived as in the case of Belgium.

2.8 Spain

Nominal ME for 1920–1935 from Carreras et al. (1989) and for 1936–1938 taken from Singer–Small (1993) (converted using the exchange rates described earlier). Nominal GDP from Prados de la Escosura (2000). Real GDP from Maddison (1995), adjusted as in the case of Belgium. Total population from Maddison (1995). Nominal CGE from Carreras et al. (1989). The Spanish WPI and CPI both taken from Mitchell (1998), combined with equal weighting to come up with a deflator for ME. Real ME derived as in the case of Belgium.

2.9 Sweden

Nominal ME and GDP from Krantz (1987). Real GDP from Maddison (1995), adjusted as in the case of Belgium. Total population from Maddison (1995). Nominal CGE calculated as explained in Eloranta (2002b). Swedish WPI and CPI from Mitchell (1998), combined with equal weighting to come up with a deflator for ME. Real ME derived as in the case of Belgium.

2.10 Switzerland

Nominal ME from Vogler (1965). Nominal GDP from Ritzmann-Blickenstorfer-David (1996). Real GDP from Maddison (1995), adjusted as in the case of Belgium. Total population from Maddison (1995). Nominal CGE from Mitchell (1998). Swiss WPI and CPI from Mitchell (1998), combined with equal weighting to come up with a deflator for ME. Real ME derived as in the case of Belgium.

2.11 The United Kingdom

Nominal ME from Sefton–Weale (1995). Nominal GDP from Sefton–Weale (1995). Real GDP from Maddison (1995), adjusted as in the case of Belgium. Total population from Maddison (1995). Nominal CGE from Mitchell (1998). British WPI and CPI both from Mitchell (1998), combined with equal weighting to come up with a deflator for ME. Real ME derived as in the case of Belgium.

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Eloranta, J. Why did the League of Nations fail?. Cliometrica 5, 27–52 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11698-010-0049-9

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