Skip to main content
Log in

Delegation aus der Sicht der Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie

  • Literaturbericht
  • Published:
Politische Vierteljahresschrift Aims and scope Submit manuscript

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Literatur

  • Agrawal, Arun, 1997: Shepherds and their Leaders among the Raikas of India: A Principal-Agent Perspective, in: Journal of Theoretical Politics, 9(2), 235–263.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Akerlof, George A., 1970: The Market for „Lemons“: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, in: Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84(1), 488–500.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Andeweg, Rudy B., 2000: Ministers as Double Agents? The Delegation Process Between Cabinet and Ministers, in: European Journal of Political Research, 37(3), 377–395.

    Google Scholar 

  • Balla, Steven J., 1998: Administrative Procedures and Political Control of the Bureaucracy, in: American Political Science Review, 92(3), 663–673.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Balla, Steven J./ Wright, John R., 2001: Interest Groups, Advisory Committees, and Congressional Control of the Bureaucracy, in: American Journal of Political Science, 45(4), 799–812.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bawn, Kathleen, 1995: Political Control versus Expertise: Congressional Choices about Administrative Procedures, in: American Political Science Review, 89(1), 62–73.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bawn, Kathleen, 1997: Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy: Statutory Constraints, Oversight, and the Committee System, in: Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 13(1), 101–127.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Berger, Helge/ de Haan, Jacob/ Eijffinger, Sylvester C. W., 2000: Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence, Discussion Paper No. 2353, London, Centre for Economic Policy Research.

    Google Scholar 

  • Braun, Dietmar, 1993: Who Governs Intermediary Agencies? Principal-Agent Relations in Research Policy-Making, in: Journal of Public Policy, 13(2), 135–162.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Braun, Dietmar, 1998: The Role of Funding Agencies in the Cognitive Development of Science, in: Research Policy, 27, 807–821.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Breton, Albert/ Wintrobe, Ronald, 1982: The Logic of Bureaucratic Conduct. An Economic Analysis of Competition, Exchange, and Efficiency, in Private and Public Organizations, Cambridge.

  • Calvert, Randall L./ McCubbins, Mathew D./ Weingast, Barry R., 1989: A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion, in: American Journal of Political Science, 33(3), 588–611.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Coleman, James S., 1990: Foundations of Social Theory, Cambridge, Mass.

  • Downs, Anthony, 1967: Inside Bureaucracy, Boston.

  • Elgie, Robert, i.E.: The Politics of the European Central Bank: Principal-Agent Theory and the Democratic Deficit, in: Journal of European Public Policy, 9(2).

  • Faverau, Olivier/ Picard, Pierre, 1996: L’approche économique des contrats: unité ou diversité?, in: Sociologie du travail, 38(4), 441–464.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ferejohn, John, 1999: Accountability and Authority: Toward a Theory of Political Accountability, in: Przeworski, Adam/ Stokes, Susan C./ Manin, Bernard (Hg.): Democracy, Accountability and Representation, Cambridge, 131–153.

  • Ferejohn, John/ Shipan, Charles, 1990: Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy, in: Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 6 (Special Issue), 1–20.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Franchino, Fabio, 2000a: The Commission’s Executive Discretion, Information and Comitology, in: Journal of Theoretical Politics, 12(2), 155–181.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Franchino, Fabio, 2000b: Control of the Commission’s Executive Functions: Uncertainty, Conflict, and Decision Rules, in: European Union Politics, 1(1), 59–88.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Franchino, Fabio, 2001: Delegating Powers in the European Union, Paper presented at the ECPR General Conference, Canterbury (UK), 6–8 September 2001.

  • Gilardi, Fabrizio, 2001: Principal-Agent Models Go to Europe: Independent Regulatory Agencies as Ultimate Step of Delegation, Paper presented at the ECPR General Conference, Canterbury (UK), 6–8 September 2001.

  • Guston, David H., 1996: Principal-Agent Theory and the Structure of Science Policy, in: Science in Public Policy, 23(4), 229–240.

    Google Scholar 

  • Heclo, Hugh, 1978: Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment, in: Anthony King (Hg.): The New American Political System, Washington, DC.

  • Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1969 (1830): Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, Hamburg.

  • Horn, Murray J./ Shepsle, Kenneth A., 1989: Commentary on „Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies“: Administrative Process and Organizational Form a Legislative Responses to Agency Costs, in: Virginia Law Review, 75, 499–508.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Huber, John D., 2000: Delegation to Civil Servants in Parliamentary Democracies, in: European Journal of Political Research, 37(3), 397–413.

    Google Scholar 

  • Huber, John D./ Lupia, Arthur, 2001: Cabinet Instability and Delegation in Parliamentary Democracies, in: American Journal of Political Science, 45(1), 18–33.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Huber, John D./ Shipan, Charles R., 2000: The Costs of Control: Legislators, Agencies, and Transaction Costs, in: Legislative Studies Quarterly, 25(1), 25–52.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Huber, John D./ Shipan, Charles R., 2001: Political Control of the State in Modern Democracies, unpublished book manuscript.

  • Huber, John D./ Shipan, Charles R./ Pfahler, Madelaine, 2001: Legislatures and Statutory Control of Bureaucracies, in: American Journal of Political Science, 45(2), 330–345.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kennedy-Chaney, Carole/ Hall-Saltzstein, Grace, 1998: Democratic Control and Bureaucratic Responsiveness: The Police and Domestic Violence, in: American Journal of Political Science, 42(3), 745–768.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kiewiet, D. Roderick/ McCubbins, Mathew D., 1991: The Logic of Delegation. Congressional Parties and the Appropriation Process, Chicago.

  • Kreps, David M., 1990: Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in: Alt, James A./ Shepsle, Kenneth A. (Hg.): Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, Cambridge, 90–143.

  • March, James G./ Olsen, Johan P., 1989: Rediscovering Institutions. The Organizational Basis of Politics, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lin, Jih-wen/ Hsu, Szu-chien, 2000: An Agency Theory of State Society Relations on Mainland China and Taiwan, Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriot Wardam Park, 31 August–3 September 2000.

  • Lupia, Arthur/ McCubbins, Mathew D., 2000: Representation or Abdication? How Citizens Use Institutions to Help Delegation Succeed, in: European Journal of Political Research, 37(3), 291–307.

    Google Scholar 

  • Macey, Jonathan R., 1992: Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative Agencies, in: Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 8(1): 93–100.

    Google Scholar 

  • Majone, Giandomenico, 1994: Independence versus Accountability? Non-Majoritarian Institutions and Democratic Government in Europe, in: Hesse, Joachim Jens/ Thoonen, Theo A. J. (Hg.): The European Yearbook of Comparative Government and Public Administration, Volume 1, Baden-Baden, 117–140.

  • Majone, Giandomenico, 1996: Regulating Europe, London.

  • Majone, Giandomenico, 2001a: Nonmajoritarian Institutions and the Limits of Democratic Governance: A Political Transaction-Cost Approach, in: Journal of Theoretical and Institutional Economics, 157, 57–78.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Majone, Giandomenico, 2001b: Two Logics of Delegation. Agency and Fiduciary Relations in EU Governance, in: European Union Politics, 2(1), 103–121.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McCubbins, Mathew D., 1985: The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure, in: American Journal of Political Science, 29, 721–748.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McCubbins, Mathew D./ Noll, Roger G./ Weingast, Barry R., 1987: Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, in: Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 3(2), 243–277.

    Google Scholar 

  • McCubbins, Mathew D./ Noll, Roger G./ Weingast, Barry R., 1989: Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, in: Virginia Law Review, 75, 431–482.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McCubbins, Mathew D./ Schwartz, Thomas, 1984: Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, in: American Journal of Political Science, 28(1), 165–179.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Milgrom, Paul/ Roberts, John, 1992: Economics, Organization und Management, Englewood Cliffs.

  • Miller, Gary J./ Moe, Terry M., 1983: Bureaucrats, Legislators, and the Size of Government, in: American Political Science Review, 77, 297–322.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mitchell, Paul, 2000: Voters and their Representatives: Electoral Institutions and Delegation in Parliamentary Democracies, in: European Journal of Political Research, 37(3), 335–351.

    Google Scholar 

  • Moe, Terry M., 1987: An Assessment of the Positive Theor of „Congressional Dominance“, in: Legislative Studies Quarterly, 12(4), 475–520.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Moe, Terry M., 1990: Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story, in: Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 6 (Special Issue), 213–253.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Moe, Terry M., 1995: The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public Bureaucracy, in: Williamson, Oliver E. (Hg.): Organization Theory. From Chester Barnhard to the Present and Beyond, Oxford, 116–153.

    Google Scholar 

  • Müller, Wolfgang C., 2000: Political Parties in Parliamentary Democracies: Making Delegation and Accountability Work, in: European Journal of Political Research, 37(3), 309–333.

    Google Scholar 

  • Niskanen, William A., 1971: Bureaucracy and Representative Government, Chicago.

  • Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel, (1961): The Theory of Representation, Berkeley.

  • Pollack, Mark A., 1997a: Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Community, in: International Organization, 51(1), 99–134.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pollack, Mark A., 1997b: The Commission as an Agent, in: Nugent, Neill (Hg.): At the Heart of the Union. Studies of the European Commission, London, 109–128.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Pollack, Mark A., 1998: The Engines of Integration? Supranational Autonomy and Influence in the European Union, in: Sandoltz, Wayne/ Stone Sweet, Alec (Hg.): European Integration and Supranational Governance, Oxford, 215–249.

  • Pollack, Mark A., 1999: Delegation, Agency and Agenda Setting in the Treaty of Amsterdam, in: European Integration online Papers, 3(6).

  • Robinson, Glen O., 1989: Commentary on „Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies“: Political Uses of Structure and Process, in: Virginia Law Review, 75, 483–498.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rose-Ackerman, Susan, 1978: Corruption. A Study in Political Economy, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Simon, Herbert A., 1993: Homo rationalis. Die Vernunft im menschlichen Leben, Frankfurt a.M.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smyrl, Marc E., 1998: When (and How) Do the Commission’s Preferences Matter?, in: Journal of Common Market Studies, 36(1), 79–99.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sofsky, Wolfgang/ Paris, Rainer, 1991: Figurationen sozialer Macht. Autorität, Stellvertretung, Koalition, Opladen.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Spulber, Daniel F./ Besanko, David, 1992: Delegation, Committment, and the Regulatory Mandate, in: Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 8(1), 126–154.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stevens, Joe B., 1993: The Economics of Collective Choice, Boulder.

  • Strem, Kaare, 2000: Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies, in: European Journal of Political Research, 37(3), 261–289.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tallberg, Jonas, i.E.: Delegation to Supranational Institutions: Why, How, and with What Consequences?, in: West European Politics, 25(1).

  • Tsebelis, George, i.E.: Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work, Princeton.

  • Weingast, Barry R., 1984: The Congressional-Bureaucratic System: A Principal-Agent Perspective (With Application to the SEC), in: Public Choice, 44, 147–191.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Williamson, Oliver E., 1975: Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications, New York.

  • Williamson, Oliver E., 1985: The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York.

  • Wood, B. Dan, 1988: Principals, Bureaucrats, and Responsiveness in Clear Air Enforcements, in: American Political Science Review, 82(1), 213–234.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wood, B. Dan/ Waterman, Richard W., 1991: The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy, in: American Political Science Review, 85(3), 801–828.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Gilardi, F., Braun, D. Delegation aus der Sicht der Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie. PVS 43, 147–161 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11615-002-0008-6

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11615-002-0008-6

Navigation