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Leistungsanreize durch Aktien oder Optionen? Eine Diskussion des State of the Art

Providing effort incentives with stock or options? A discussion of the state of the art

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Zusammenfassung

Aktienoptionspläne für Vorstände sind in der jüngsten Vergangenheit stark in die öffentliche Kritik geraten. Parallel dazu wird eine intensive wissenschaftliche Diskussion über ihre Effizienz als Anreizinstrument geführt. Dieser Beitrag gibt einen Überblick über die (überwiegend numerischen) Ergebnisse jüngerer Beiträge zu den Leistungsanreizen aktienkursorientierter Vergütungsinstrumente. Die Ergebnisse der Beiträge werden vor dem Hintergrund des Grundmodells der Principal-Agent-Theorie diskutiert und interpretiert.

Summary

Stock options for executives have been heavily debated in the public media. The growing criticism has been accompanied by research papers that address stock options’ efficiency in providing effort incentives. This paper gives an overview over recent research and contrasts the (mainly numerical) findings with implications from the basic principal-agent-model.

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Authors
  1. Markus C. Arnold
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  2. Robert M. Gillenkirch
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Arnold, M.C., Gillenkirch, R.M. Leistungsanreize durch Aktien oder Optionen? Eine Diskussion des State of the Art. Z. Betriebswirtsch 77, 75–99 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11573-007-0005-8

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