Direct Brain Interventions and Responsibility Enhancement
- Elizabeth Shaw
- … show all 1 hide
Purchase on Springer.com
$39.95 / €34.95 / £29.95*
Rent the article at a discountRent now
* Final gross prices may vary according to local VAT.
Advances in neuroscience might make it possible to develop techniques for directly altering offenders’ brains, in order to make offenders more responsible and law-abiding. The idea of using such techniques within the criminal justice system can seem intuitively troubling, even if they were more effective in preventing crime than traditional methods of rehabilitation. One standard argument against this use of brain interventions is that it would undermine the individual’s free will. This paper maintains that ‘free will’ (at least, as that notion is understood by those who adopt the influential compatibilist approach) is an inadequate basis for explaining what is problematic about some direct brain interventions. This paper then defends an alternative way of objecting to certain kinds of direct brain interventions, focusing on the relationship between the offender and the state rather than the notion of free will. It opposes the use of interventions which aim to enhance ‘virtue responsibility’ (by instilling particular values about what is right and wrong), arguing that this would objectify offenders. In contrast, it argues that it may be acceptable to use direct brain interventions to enhance ‘capacity responsibility’ (i.e. to strengthen the abilities necessary for the exercise of responsible agency, such as self-control). Finally it considers how to distinguish these different kinds of responsibility enhancement.
- Adebowale, V. (2010). Diversion not detention. Public Policy Research, 17(2), 71–74. CrossRef
- Arpaly, N. (2002). Unprincipled virtue. Oxford: Oxford University Press. CrossRef
- Barbaree, H., Blanchard, R., & Langton, C. (2003). The development of sexual aggression through the life span. The effect of age on sexual arousal and recidivism among sex offenders. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 989, 59–71. CrossRef
- Blair, J., Mitchell, D., & Blair, K. (2008). The psychopath emotion and the brain. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Bolt, I., & Scherner, M. (2009). Psychopharmaceutical enhancers: Enhancing identity? Neuroethics, 2, 103–111. CrossRef
- Bomann-Larsen, L. (2011). Voluntary rehabilitation? On neurotechnological behavioural treatment, valid consent and (in)appropriate offers. Neuroethics,. doi:10.1007/s1215201191059.
- Bourget, D., & Chalmers, D. (Eds.) (2009). The philpapers survey. http://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl Accessed 31st May 2011.
- Bublitz, J. C., & Merkel, R. (2009). Autonomy and authenticity of enhanced personality traits. Bioethics, 23(6), 360–374. CrossRef
- Dennett, D. (1984). Elbow room: The varieties of free will worth wanting. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Dennett, D. (2011). “My brain made me do it”. (When neuroscientists think they can do philosophy). European University Institute: Max Weber Lecture Series, no. 2011/1, 1–14.
- Duff, R. A. (1986). Trials and punishments. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Duff, R. A. (2001). Punishment, communication and community. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fara, M. (2008). Masked abilities and compatibilism. Mind, 117(468), 843–865.
- Feinberg, J. (1989). The moral limits of the criminal law, Volume 3: Harm to self. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fischer, J. M., & Ravizza, M. (1998). Responsibility and control: A theory of moral responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Frankfurt, H. (1969). Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility. Journal of Philosophy, 66, 829–839. CrossRef
- Haji, I., & Cuypers, S. (2007). Magical agents, global induction, and the internalism/externalism debate. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 85, 343–371. CrossRef
- Hodges, A. (2012). Alan Turing: The enigma. (The Centenary Edition). London: Random House.
- Kant, I. (1948). The moral law: Groundwork of the metaphysic of morals (trans: Paton H.). London: Routledge.
- Kennett, J. (2006). Do psychopaths really threaten moral rationalism? Philosophical Explorations, 9(1), 69–82. CrossRef
- Levy, N. (2007). Neuroethics: Challenges for the 21st century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. CrossRef
- Maibom, H. (2008). The mad, the bad and the psychopath. Neuroethics, 1, 167–184. CrossRef
- McKenna, M. (2001). Book review: Responsibility and control: A theory of moral responsibility, by John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza. Journal of Philosophy, 98, 93–100. CrossRef
- McKenna, M. (2008). A hard-line reply to Pereboom’s four-case manipulation argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 77, 142–159. CrossRef
- Ministry of Justice (2010). Compendium of re-offending statistics and analysis. http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/docs/compendium-of-reoffending-statistics-and-analysis.pdf [last accessed 2/08/11].
- Newman, J., Curtin, J., Bertsch, J., & Baskin-Sommers, A. (2010). Attention moderates the fearlessness of psychopathic offenders. Biological Psychiatry, 67, 66–70. CrossRef
- Pereboom, D. (2006). Reasons-responsiveness, alternative possibililities, and manipulation arguments against compatibilism: Reflections on John Martin Fischer’s my way. Philosophical Books, 47, 198–212.
- Quinsey, V. (2002). Evolutionary theory and criminal behaviour. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 7(1), 1–13. CrossRef
- Reicher, S. (2006). Saving Bulgaria’s Jews: An analysis of social identity and the mobilisation of social solidarity. European Journal of Social Psychology, 36, 49–72. CrossRef
- Shaw, E. (2011a). Free will, punishment and neurotechnologies. In L. Klaming & B. Van den Berg (Eds.), Technologies on the stand: Legal and ethical questions in neuroscience and robotics (pp. 41–65). Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers.
- Shaw, E. (2011b). Cognitive enhancement and criminal behaviour. In E. Hildt & K. Liebe (Eds.), Neuroenhancement. University of Mainz, forthcoming.
- Stern, L. (1974). Freedom, blame, and moral community. The Journal of Philosophy, 71, 72–84. CrossRef
- Vihvelin, K. (2004). Free will demystified: A dispositional account. Philosophical Topics, 32, 427–450.
- Vincent, N. (2009). Responsibility: Distinguishing virtue from capacity. Polish Journal of Philosophy, 3(1), 111–126.
- Vincent, N. (2011). Capacitarianism, responsibility and restored mental capacities. In L. Klaming & B. Van den Berg (Eds.), Technologies on the stand: Legal and ethical questions in neuroscience and robotics (pp. 41–65). Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers.
- West, R. (1984). The fountain overflows. London: Virago Press.
- Direct Brain Interventions and Responsibility Enhancement
Criminal Law and Philosophy
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
- Additional Links
- Moral enhancement
- Free will
- Industry Sectors
- Elizabeth Shaw (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. School of Law, University of Edinburgh, Old College, South Bridge, Edinburgh, EH8 9YL, UK