The Review of International Organizations

, Volume 6, Issue 3, pp 369–391

Foreign aid and global governance: Buying Bretton Woods – the Swiss-bloc case

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11558-011-9111-z

Cite this article as:
Vreeland, J.R. Rev Int Organ (2011) 6: 369. doi:10.1007/s11558-011-9111-z

Abstract

Power in the world’s preeminent international financial institutions—the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund—resides in their Executive Boards. How do governments get elected to these international committees? This study quantitatively explores whether wealthy governments provide more foreign aid to poor governments that offer them political support. The focus is on Switzerland, which is elected to the Executive Board of the Bretton Woods Institutions by a group of countries from Central and Western Asia, and Eastern and Southern Europe. Results confirm the hypothesis. Implications for governance in a multipolar world are discussed.

Keywords

Switzerland Foreign aid IMF World Bank Central Asia Global governance 

JEL codes

F33 F35 F5 F53 F55 

Supplementary material

11558_2011_9111_MOESM1_ESM.do (11 kb)
ESM 1(DO 10.7 kb)
11558_2011_9111_MOESM2_ESM.dta (1.2 mb)
ESM 2(DTA 1.17 mb)
11558_2011_9111_MOESM3_ESM.txt (198 kb)
ESM 3(LOG 198 kb)

Copyright information

© Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and the Department of GovernmentGeorgetown UniversityWashingtonUSA

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