Frontiers of Philosophy in China

, Volume 1, Issue 4, pp 675–687

A critique to the significance of Gettier counter-examples

Research Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11466-006-0031-6

Cite this article as:
Cao, J. Front. Philos. China (2006) 1: 675. doi:10.1007/s11466-006-0031-6


Usually, people think that Gettier counter-examples challenged the traditional tripartite definition of knowledge and fundamentally changed the characteristic of the contemporary epistemology. This paper argues that regard for Gettier counter-examples is exaggerated, because (i) the JTB definition is neither an important nor a comprehensive one that covers all knowledge. Moreover, the significance of Gettier counter-examples is limited. (ii) The source of Gettier counter-examples lies in one arbitrary judgment, two mix-ups, three false assumptions, and a misunderstanding about the JTB definition.


epistemologyGettier counter-examplesdefinition of knowledge

Copyright information

© Higher Education Press and Springer-Verlag 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyFudan UniversityShanghaiChina
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyXiamen UniversityXiamenChina