, Volume 41, Issue 3, pp 831–839

Counterfactuals, Autonomy and Downward Causation: Reply to Zhong


DOI: 10.1007/s11406-013-9444-3

Cite this article as:
Moore, D. Philosophia (2013) 41: 831. doi:10.1007/s11406-013-9444-3


In recent papers, Lei Zhong argues that the autonomy solution to the causal exclusion problem is unavailable to anyone that endorses the counterfactual model of causation. The linchpin of his argument is that the counterfactual theory entails the downward causation principle, which conflicts with the autonomy solution. In this note I argue that the counterfactual theory does not entail the downward causation principle, so it is possible to advocate for the autonomy solution to the causal exclusion problem from within the counterfactual theory of causation.


Causal exclusionMental causationNonreductive physicalismAutonomyCounterfactual theory of causation

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© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy DepartmentUniversity of TorontoTorontoCanada