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Supererogation and Intentions of the Agent

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Abstract

It has been claimed, by David Heyd, that in order for an act to count as supererogatory the agent performing the act must possess altruistic intentions (1982 p.115). This requirement, Heyd claims, allows us to make sense of the meritorious nature of acts of supererogation. In this paper I will investigate whether there is good reason to accept that this requirement is a necessary condition of supererogation. I will argue that such a reason can be found in cases where two people act in the same way but with only the person who acted with altruistic intent counting as having performed an act of supererogation. In such cases Heyd’s intention requirement plays an important role in ruling out acts that intuitively are not supererogatory. Despite this, I will argue that we should reject Heyd’s requirement and replace it with a moral intention requirement. I will then investigate how to formulate this requirement and respond to two objections that might be raised against it.

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Notes

  1. The first discussion of the possibility of the existence of acts of this kind was Urmson (1958).

  2. The terminology ‘intentional under a description’ was introduced by Elizabeth Anscombe, who noted that a single action can have several different descriptions and only be intentional under some of these descriptions (2000 p.11). For example, an act may meet the descriptions ‘sawing a plank’ and ‘making a squeaky noise with a saw,’ but only intentional under the first (Anscombe 2000 p.11).

  3. A related issue is the debate between objectivists and subjectivists about moral obligation. For a defence of the subjectivist view see Smith (2010). For a defence of Objectivism see Graham (2010). Objectivists hold that the rightness of performing an act in any given situation is determined by the objective facts of the situation, not the agent’s beliefs about those facts. On this understanding of obligation, it does not matter whether or not the agent is aware, or even could be aware, of what the best act would be. Subjectivists, on the other hand, hold that the act that it is right for an agent to perform is determined by her beliefs about the situation. Note that on the objectivist account we can perform a moral obligation without having any awareness that doing so will be the right thing to do. Heyd’s point is that whatever we think about moral obligation, the view of the agent plays an important part in assessing whether or not an act can be classed as supererogatory. Heyd’s requirement then, has a subjective component to it. In order for an act to count as supererogatory the agent must believe that it will have good consequences for others or at least be performing the act as an attempt to benefit others. Of course, AIR requires more from agents than subjectivists about moral obligation do. As well as performing the act that is right from a subjective point of view the act must also be performed with the intention of benefitting other people.

  4. Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting an example of this kind.

  5. McNamara says that this is part of ‘The Standard Analysis’ (2011 p.203). Mellema says that this is part of ‘The Standard Account’ (1991 p17). The view is endorsed by Hale (1991 p.273), Horgan and Timmons (2010 p. 32), Jacobs (1987 p.97), Kawall (2003 p.495), Montague (1989 p.102) and Peterfreund (1978 p.54).

  6. For an explanation of Mill’s position here see Ridge (2002).

  7. A similar point is made by Ridge (2002 p.66).

  8. For example, Kant distinguishes acts that are in line with duty from those that possess moral worth. In order to have moral worth, an act must be performed by an agent who is motivated in the right way. (1993 p.11). Similarly, Ross claims that an act can be morally right but not morally good (2003 p.156).

  9. Both Bloomberg and Pheffer described Autrey’s act as “beyond the call of duty”. Both mention Autrey’s intentions: Pheffer says that Autrey acted, “to save a strangers life”, while Bloomberg describes Autrey as acting, “to rescue a complete stranger.” For the report on Pheffer’s quote see The Wave (2007). For a transcription of Bloomberg’s speech see (NYC.gov 2007). Philosophers are also happy to describe Autrey’s act as supererogatory without explaining what motivated him to perform the act. Both Ferry (2012) and Weinberg (2011 p.274), describe Autrey’s act as a clear case of supererogation without explaining what motivated Autrey to perform the act.

  10. Of course, it may well be inappropriate to describe Autrey* as a hero but that is just because describing someone as a ‘hero’ is a character assessment rather than an act assessment. Although, performing an act of supererogation and being a saint or a hero are often linked they are not equivilent. As McNamara points out (2011 p.219), some heroic acts may be morally required. For example, we might describe a fireman as a hero for running into a burning building whilst also judging that he was morally required to do so. In addition, some supererogatory acts may not be saintly or heroic. Those who accept, as Heyd (1982 p.148) and Mellema (1991 p.7) do, that small favours, such as stopping to help a stranger fix her car, are supererogatory surely do not view all such acts as saintly or heroic. Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this concern.

  11. For an introduction to implicature see Grice (1991 Chapter 2).

  12. In Mellema’s description of this example he says that the act will bring about only ‘bad consequences’ (1991 p.20). I have changed this to ‘indifferent consequences’ because I believe it makes the example more plausible. This in no way changes the point that Mellema is making.

  13. Hence why the title of one of Wiesenthal’s books is Justice Not Vengeance (1989). In this book Wiesenthal’s friend, Peter Michael Lingens, tells of the important role that the idea of justice had in shaping Wiesenthal’s view of the world from an early age (1989 p.3).

  14. Wiesenthal talks of the emotional pain he put himself thorough here (1989 p.27) and the physical attacks here (1989 p.401).

  15. Wiesenthal suggests that this was the intention behind many of his acts (1989 p.411).

  16. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this point.

  17. A similar point is made by Mellema (1991 p. 20).

  18. Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting that one example might not be enough here.

  19. For discussions of whether or not Huck Finn can be said to be morally praiseworthy see Jonathan Bennett (1974) and Nomy Arpaly (2003).

  20. Note that this problem only arises if we have a teleological conception of value, that is, one that holds that it is states of the world that are the primary bearers of value. If we have a buck passing view of value then we can ignore this problem. A buck passing view is one that holds the following: “Being valuable is not a property that provides us with reasons. Rather, to call something valuable is to say that it has other properties that provide reasons for behaving in certain ways with regard to it,” (Scanlon 1998 p.96). If we accept this view of value then we can hold that Act A might be just as valuable overall as Act B but less morally valuable. Thanks to Mike Ridge’ and an anonymous referee for helpful discussions on this point.

  21. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this point.

  22. As Kawall points out (2003 p.488), this view of supererogation seems to be assumed by both Jacobs (1985) and McGoldrick (1984).

  23. Of course, we might think that there is a sense in which the waiter is making a sacrifice. This might suggest that this is not a good way to respond to Kawall’s argument.

  24. Thanks to the audience at The 2012 University of Edinburgh Ethics Fest for helpful comments on an early draft of this paper. Special thanks to Elinor Mason, Mike Ridge and three anonymous referees for this journal for their detailed and insightful comments. A Career Development Studentship from the University of Edinburgh funded the writing of this paper.

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Archer, A. Supererogation and Intentions of the Agent. Philosophia 41, 447–462 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-013-9422-9

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