Philosophia

, Volume 40, Issue 4, pp 857–875

The Distinction between Knowledge-That and Knowledge-How

Authors

    • Philosophy DepartmentZhejiang University
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11406-012-9361-x

Cite this article as:
Ren, H. Philosophia (2012) 40: 857. doi:10.1007/s11406-012-9361-x
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Abstract

I first argue why Stanley and Williamson fail to eliminate the distinction between knowledge-that and knowledge-how. Then I argue that knowledge-how consists in a special kind of ways of thinking of ways of engaging in actions. So the distinction between knowledge-that and knowledge-how is twofold: the objects of knowledge-that and knowledge-how are different; the ways in which we entertain the object of knowledge are also distinct when we have knowledge-that and knowledge-how. At the end, I consider two recent intellectualist efforts on knowledge-how and show why they fail.

Keywords

Knowledge-howIntellectualism

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012