The Ontology of Causal Process Theories
- Anton Froeyman
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There is a widespread belief that the so-called process theories of causation developed by Wesley Salmon and Phil Dowe have given us an original account of what causation really is. In this paper, I show that this is a misconception. The notion of “causal process” does not offer us a new ontological account of causation. I make this argument by explicating the implicit ontological commitments in Salmon and Dowe’s theories. From this, it is clear that Salmon’s Mark Transmission Theory collapses to a counterfactual theory of causation, while the Conserved Quantity Theory collapses to David Fair’s phsyicalist reduction of causation.
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- The Ontology of Causal Process Theories
Volume 40, Issue 3 , pp 523-538
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
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- Process theories of causation
- Ontological commitments
- Anton Froeyman (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Centre for Critical Philosophy, Department of Philosophy and Moral Sciences, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium