What Exactly is the Explanatory Gap?
- David Papineau
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It is widely agreed among contemporary philosophers of mind that science leaves us with an ‘explanatory gap’—that even after we know everything that science can tell us about the conscious mind and the brain, their relationship still remains mysterious. I argue that this agreed view is quite mistaken. The feeling of a ‘explanatory gap’ arises only because we cannot stop ourselves thinking about the mind–brain relation in a dualist way.
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- What Exactly is the Explanatory Gap?
Volume 39, Issue 1 , pp 5-19
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
- Additional Links
- Explanatory gap
- Dualist intuition
- Phenomenal concepts
- Reductive explanatory
- Mind-brain identity
- David Papineau (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Philosophy, King’s College London, Strand, WC2R 2LS, London, England, UK