Moral Responsibility Invariantism
- Brandon Warmke
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Moral responsibility invariantism is the view that there is a single set of conditions for being morally responsible for an action (or omission or consequence of an act or omission) that applies in all cases. I defend this view against some recent arguments by Joshua Knobe and John Doris.
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- Moral Responsibility Invariantism
Volume 39, Issue 1 , pp 179-200
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- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
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- Moral responsibility
- Experimental philosophy
- Brandon Warmke (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, Social Science Bldg. Rm 213, PO Box 210027, Tucson, Arizona 85721‐0027, USA