Philosophia

, Volume 39, Issue 1, pp 179–200

Moral Responsibility Invariantism

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11406-010-9262-9

Cite this article as:
Warmke, B. Philosophia (2011) 39: 179. doi:10.1007/s11406-010-9262-9

Abstract

Moral responsibility invariantism is the view that there is a single set of conditions for being morally responsible for an action (or omission or consequence of an act or omission) that applies in all cases. I defend this view against some recent arguments by Joshua Knobe and John Doris.

Keywords

Moral responsibilityDorisKnobeExperimental philosophy

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of ArizonaTucsonUSA