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A Dilemma for Rule-Consequentialism

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Abstract

Rule-consequentialists tend to argue for their normative theory by claiming that their view matches our moral convictions just as well as a pluralist set of Rossian duties. As an additional advantage, rule-consequentialism offers a unifying justification for these duties. I challenge the first part of the ruleconsequentialist argument and show that Rossian duties match our moral convictions better than the rule-consequentialist principles. I ask the rule-consequentialists a simple question. In the case that circumstances change, is the wrongness of acts determined by the ideal principles for the earlier circumstances or by the ideal ones for the new circumstances? I argue that whichever answer the rule-consequentialists give the view leads to normative conclusions that conflict with our moral intuitions. Because some set of Rossian duties can avoid similar problems, rule-consequentialism fails in the reflective equilibrium test advocated by the rule-consequentialists.

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Notes

  1. This test of narrow reflective equilibrium is conditional on the fact that the theory which fares worse in it does not cohere considerably better with our non-moral beliefs, i.e., on the fact that this theory does not fare significantly better in the wide reflective equilibrium test.

  2. There have also been other attempts to argue that rule-consequentialism has counter-intuitive implications. For instance, it has been argued that rule-consequentialism is too demanding (see Mulgan 2001, ch. 3 for the objection, and Hooker 2004 for a reply). It’s not clear whether all these objections are available for the Rossian who also accepts a prima facie duty of beneficence.

  3. In general, rule-consequentialists can play with the notion of well-being in order to get the view to fit our intuitions about distributive justice. They can also claim that the well-being of the worse-off counts for more than that of others (Hooker 2000a, pp. 55–9).

  4. I thank the anonymous referee of Philosophia for bringing this point up.

  5. This case is from Montague 2000 but the intuitions about it and the conclusions drawn are from Hooker’s reply (see Hooker 2000b, sec. 6). Hooker himself uses a similar thought-experiment involving helping others to argue for a similar conclusion. He considers the moral status of altruistic concern. He argues that, in the worlds in which people are very incompetent in helping others, a normal level of such concern would constitute a vice rather than a virtue. This doesn’t quite reveal whether he thinks that showing altruistic concern in that world would be morally wrong.

  6. Hooker seems to accept this view (see Hooker 2000a, p. 32, footnote 1; Hooker 2000b, sec. 6; and Hooker 2005, p. 268).

  7. This section is partly based on an observation by McNaughton and Rawling (McNaughton and Rawling 1998, pp. 46–7). They note that, even though the optimific moral principles for the actual world may include intuitive moral constraints, there are possible worlds in which the optimific moral principles do not contain them. So, if these moral constraints were in their absolute form a part of our moral intuitions, then rule-consequentialism would have unintuitive implications. McNaughton and Rawling do not give any examples of such absolute constraints. Hooker’s strategy has been to argue that absolute constraints are not part of our moral convictions (Hooker 2000a, pp. 134–6). Philip Montague discusses the earlier circumstances where promise-keeping is generally harmful and therefore keeping promises is forbidden by the optimific principles (Montague 2000). However, our intuition does not seem to be that promise-keeping would be permissible even in those circumstances (see Hooker 2000b, sec. 6). Berys Gaut argues similarly that, based on special relationships, we necessarily have obligations that are independent of their effects on well-being (Gaut 1999, pp. 42–4). These obligations would remain in the worlds in which the relationships might on balance decrease general well-being.

  8. There is an interesting question of whether sadistic pleasures should be taken into account in the cost–benefit analyses of the moral codes at all (see Hooker 2005, p. 276 for a discussion).

  9. I thank the anonymous referee of Philosophia for raising this objection.

  10. Notice that the sadist cannot, by definition, aim in the new circumstances at the later well-being of others by doing ‘sadistic acts’ and hoping that the Angel interferes. This would not count as sadism since the sadist would no longer be motivated solely by the suffering of others but also by their well-being. In such cases, the agent would be aiming at beneficence by pain-inflicting acts. Ironically, the Angel, who is only concerned about pure sadism, would not then interfere and only suffering would be inflicted.

  11. I thank again the anonymous referee of Philosophia for pushing this objection.

  12. See Hooker 2003, p. 58 for a corresponding requirement for contractualism.

  13. Ross himself could probably not have accepted such a duty because he did not think that duties can require us to act or not act from specific motives (Ross 1930, pp. 4–6).

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Correspondence to Jussi Suikkanen.

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Suikkanen, J. A Dilemma for Rule-Consequentialism. Philosophia 36, 141–150 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-007-9094-4

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