Shabo, S. Philosophia (2007) 35: 63. doi:10.1007/s11406-007-9050-3
In recent years, many incompatibilists have come to reject the traditional association of moral responsibility with alternative possibilities. Kevin Timpe argues that one such incompatibilist, Eleonore Stump, ultimately fails in her bid to sever this link. While she may have succeeded in dissociating responsibility from the freedom to perform a different action, he argues, she ends up reinforcing a related link, between responsibility and the freedom to act under a different mode. In this paper, I argue that Timpe’s response to Stump exploits concessions she need not have made. The upshot is that, contrary to what Timpe maintains, there is no reason to doubt that Stump's brand of incompatibilism is a genuine alternative to the traditional variety.
Kevin Timpe Eleonore Stump Compatibilism Source incompatibilism Frankfurt-style cases Principle of Alternative Possibilities Causal determinism Moral responsibility Flickers of freedom