Compatibilism and Doxastic Control Authors
First Online: 07 October 2006 Received: 25 April 2006 Accepted: 06 May 2006 DOI:
Cite this article as: Buckareff, A.A. Philosophia (2006) 34: 143. doi:10.1007/s11406-006-9013-0
Sharon Ryan has recently argued that if one has compatibilist intuitions about free action, then one should reject the claim that agents cannot exercise direct voluntary control over coming to believe. In this paper I argue that the differences between beliefs and actions make the expectation of direct voluntary control over coming to believe unreasonable. So Ryan's theory of doxastic agency is untenable.
Alvarez, M., & Hyman, J. (1998). Agents and their actions.
Audi, R. (2001). Doxastic voluntarism and the ethics of belief. In M. Steup (Ed.),
Knowledge, truth, and duty
(pp. 93–111). New York: Oxford University Press.
Bach, K. (1980). Actions are not events.
Mind, 89, 114–120.
Bishop, J. (1989).
Natural agency: An essay on the causal theory of action. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Brand, M. (1984).
Intending and acting. Cambridge: MIT.
Bratman, M. (2001). Two problems about human agency.
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 101
Buckareff, A. (2004). Acceptance and deciding to believe.
Journal of Philosophical Research, 29, 173–190.
Buckareff, A. (2005). How (not) to think about mental action.
Philosophical Explorations, 8
Buckareff, A. (2006). Doxastic decisions and controlling belief.
Acta Analytica, 21, 102–114.
Buckareff, A. (forthcoming A). Hobartian voluntarism and epistemic deontologism.
Buckareff, A. (forthcoming B). Mental overpopulation and mental action: Protecting intentions from mental birth control
Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
Buckareff, A., & Zhu, J. (2004). Causalisms reconsidered.
Feldman, R. (2001). Voluntary belief and epistemic evaluation. In M. Steup (Ed.),
Knowledge, truth, and duty
(pp. 77–92). New York: Oxford University Press.
Feldman, R. (2004). The ethics of belief. In E. Conee & R. Feldman (Eds.),
Evidentialism: Essays in epistemology (pp. 166–95). New York: Oxford University Press.
Ginet, C. (1990).
On action. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Mele, A. (1992).
Springs of action: Understanding intentional behavior. New York: Oxford University Press.
Montmarquet, J. (1986). The voluntariness of belief.
Mossel, B. (2005). Action, control and sensations of acting.
Philosophical Studies, 124
Pojman, L. (1985). Believing and willing.
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 15, 37–55.
Ruben, D.-H. (1997). Doing without happenings: Three theories of action. In G. Holmstrom-Hintikka & R. Tuomela (Eds.),
Contemporary action theory, vol. I (pp. 267–286). Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Ruben, D.-H. (2003).
Action and its explanation. New York: Oxford University Press.
Ryan, S. (2003). Doxastic compatibilism and the ethics of belief.
Philosophical Studies, 114
Searle, J. (1983).
Intentionality: An essay in the philosophy of mind. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Thalberg, I. (1984). Do our intentions cause our intentional actions?
American Philosophical Quarterly, 21, 249–260. Copyright information
© Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2006