, Volume 34, Issue 2, pp 143–152

Compatibilism and Doxastic Control


    • Department of PhilosophyFranklin and Marshall College

DOI: 10.1007/s11406-006-9013-0

Cite this article as:
Buckareff, A.A. Philosophia (2006) 34: 143. doi:10.1007/s11406-006-9013-0


Sharon Ryan has recently argued that if one has compatibilist intuitions about free action, then one should reject the claim that agents cannot exercise direct voluntary control over coming to believe. In this paper I argue that the differences between beliefs and actions make the expectation of direct voluntary control over coming to believe unreasonable. So Ryan's theory of doxastic agency is untenable.


doxastic voluntarism belief agency action theory epistemology

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© Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2006