Topoi

, Volume 31, Issue 1, pp 47–57

Truth from a Proof-Theoretic Perspective

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11245-012-9121-3

Cite this article as:
Tranchini, L. Topoi (2012) 31: 47. doi:10.1007/s11245-012-9121-3

Abstract

Validity, the central concept of the so-called ‘proof-theoretic semantics’ is described as correctly applying to the arguments that denote proofs. In terms of validity, I propose an anti-realist characterization of the notions of truth and correct assertion, at the core of which is the idea that valid arguments may fail to be recognized as such. The proposed account is compared with Dummett’s and Prawitz’s views on the matter.

Keywords

Proof-theoretic semantics Truth Assertion 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Wilhelm-Schickard-InstitutEberhard Karls Universität TübingenTübingenGermany

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