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Extended present bias: a direct experimental test

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Abstract

This study experimentally tests our proposed extended present bias hypothesis—discount factor increases over the proximate future and eventually approaches constancy, but remains distinct from unity in the remote future. Using front-end delay and a post-dated check for payment, discount factors are elicited for three seven-day durations: between 2 and 9 days later (proximate), between 31 and 38 days later (intermediate), and between 301 versus 308 days later (remote). We find support for diminishing discounting between the proximate and intermediate comparisons, but not between the intermediate and the remote comparisons. The findings validate our extended present bias hypothesis.

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Notes

  1. Since people are impatient (i.e., they prefer to receive the same amount of money or even a smaller amount sooner than later), the discount factor, which equals \(1/(1+r)^{{\textit{t}}}\) where r is the discount rate, is the present value of a future payment at time t and should be smaller than one and decrease with time.

  2. Earlier literature has been criticized for the liberal use of hypothetical questions and the lack of controls for effects that may be due to framing and transaction cost, among others [see Frederick et al. (2002) for a review of different methods]. This has given rise to a subsequent literature that employs real monetary incentives to elicit discount rates.

  3. Halevy further links his account to the social learning theory of Rotter (1954) by emphasizing the role of life experience in shaping the individual’s preferences (personality) and subjective beliefs in evaluating alternative actions. In the context of near term versus remote term rewards, a person may adhere to the probability that a promise of a delayed reward will not be kept. Support for Rotter’s hypothesis can be found in studies such as that of Mischel (1961), who showed that father-absent children possess lower expectations for the delivery of the promise of delayed reward, resulting in seemingly more impatient choices.

  4. The studies of Read (2001) and Read and Roelofsma (2003) did not use incentivized experiments.

  5. Group level estimation of parameters in different utility specifications from choices in multiple price lists is done to elicit degree of risk aversion (Holt and Laury 2002) and discounting (Andersen et al. 2011).

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Acknowledgments

We are grateful to the staff of the Experimental Economics Lab of the Department of Industrial Economics, Jinan University, Guangzhou for facilitating the experiment. We also acknowledge the financial support from the Department of Economics of the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and the Ministry of Education, Singapore (Project Title: Biological Economics and Decision Making).

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Correspondence to Songfa Zhong.

Appendices

Appendices

1.1 Appendix 1: Experimental instruction

Welcome to our study on decision making. The descriptions of the study contained in this experimental instrument will be implemented fully and faithfully. The overall compensation includes a $50 show up fee in addition to earnings based on how you make decisions. All information provided will be kept CONFIDENTIAL. Information in the study including your personal information as well as your decisions will be used for research purposes only. You are not to discuss with anyone any aspect of the specific tasks during or after the study.

  1. 1.

    The set of decision making tasks and the instructions for each task are the same for all participants.

  2. 2.

    It is important to read the instructions CAREFULLY so that you understand the tasks and make better decisions.

  3. 3.

    If you have any questions, please raise your hand to ask our experimenters at ANY TIME.

  4. 4.

    PLEASE DO NOT communicate with others during the experiment.

  5. 5.

    Please take the time to go through the instructions carefully and make your decisions.

  6. 6.

    Cell phones and other electronic devices (with the exception of calculator functions), are not allowed.

  7. 7.

    Today’s session will last about half an hour.

This task involves your choosing between receiving a sum of money on a specific day and another sum of money on another specific day. There are 30 choices to make. The first ten pairs of choices are about receiving $100 2 days later versus receiving a larger amount 9 days later; the second ten pairs of choices are about receiving $100 in 31 days versus receiving a larger amount of money in 38 days; the third ten pairs of choices are about receiving $100 in 301 days versus receiving a larger amount of money in 308 days.

We will pay you according to one randomly selected choice out of the 30 choices. Specifically, we will give you cheques with the specified date at the end of today’s experiment. Under Hong Kong banking practices, a cheque can be deposited on or after the date of the cheque. Since it will take one day to clear the cheque, to make sure you may cash the cheque on the date specified in your choice, the date on the cheque will be one day before the specified date.

Please indicate your choices in the next page.

Decision: For each of the 30 rows, please indicate your decision with a tick (\(\surd )\)

 

A

B

 

2 days later

9 days later

\(1\)

$100

$101

\(2\)

$100

$104

\(3\)

$100

$107

\(4\)

$100

$110

\(5\)

$100

$113

\(6\)

$100

$116

\(7\)

$100

$119

\(8\)

$100

$122

\(9\)

$100

$125

\(10\)

$100

$128

 

A

B

 

31 days later

38 days later

\(11\)

$100

$101

\(12\)

$100

$104

\(13\)

$100

$107

\(14\)

$100

$110

\(15\)

$100

$113

\(16\)

$100

$116

\(17\)

$100

$119

\(18\)

$100

$122

\(19\)

$100

$125

\(20\)

$100

$128

 

301 days later

308 days later

\(21\)

$100

$101

\(22\)

$100

$104

\(23\)

$100

$107

\(24\)

$100

$110

\(25\)

$100

$113

\(26\)

$100

$116

\(27\)

$100

$119

\(28\)

$100

$122

\(29\)

$100

$125

\(30\)

$100

$128

1.2 Appendix 2: Raw data

figure a

Switch points in Menu 1 and Menu 2. The columns (rows) represent the switch points in the 2 vs. 9 days (31 vs. 38 days) menu. Choices on the diagonal correspond to exponential/quasi-hyperbolic discounters (\(n = 39\)) who have the same switch points in the two menus. Choices in the upper right correspond to hyperbolic discounters (\(n = 18\)) who switch later in the later menu. Choices in the lower left correspond to counter-hyperbolic discounters (\(n = 7\)) who switch earlier in the later menu.

figure b

Switch points in Menu 1 and Menu 3. The columns (rows) represent the switch points in the 2 vs. 9 days (301 vs. 308 days) menu. Choices on the diagonal correspond to exponential/quasi-hyperbolic discounters (\(n = 35\)) who have the same switch points in the two menus. Choices in the upper right correspond to hyperbolic discounters (\(n = 23\)) who switch later in the later menu. Choices in the lower left correspond to counter-hyperbolic discounters (\(n = 6\)) who switch earlier in the later menu.

figure c

Switch points in Menu 2 and Menu 3. The columns (rows) represent the switch points in the 31 vs. 38 days (301 vs. 308 days) menu. Choices on the diagonal correspond to exponential/quasi-hyperbolic discounters (\(n = 47\)) who have the same switch points in the two menus. Choices in the upper right correspond to hyperbolic discounters (\(n = 13\)) who switch later in the later menu. Choices in the lower left correspond to counter-hyperbolic discounters (\(n = 4\)) who switch earlier in the later menu.

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Chark, R., Chew, S.H. & Zhong, S. Extended present bias: a direct experimental test. Theory Decis 79, 151–165 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-014-9462-z

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-014-9462-z

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