The potential of iterative voting to solve the separability problem in referendum elections
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In referendum elections, voters are often required to register simultaneous votes on multiple proposals. The separability problem occurs when a voter’s preferred outcome on one proposal depends on the outcomes of other proposals. This type of interdependence can lead to unsatisfactory or even paradoxical election outcomes, such as a winning outcome that is the last choice of every voter. Here we propose an iterative voting scheme that allows voters to revise their voting strategies based on the outcomes of previous iterations. Using a robust computer simulation, we investigate the potential of this approach to solve the separability problem.
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- The potential of iterative voting to solve the separability problem in referendum elections
Theory and Decision
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- Springer US
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- Referendum elections
- Iterative voting
- Computer simulation
- Game theory
- Industry Sectors
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Division of Applied Mathematics, Brown University, Providence, RI, 02912, USA
- 2. Department of Mathematics, Grand Valley State University, Allendale, MI, 49401, USA
- 3. Marian University College of Osteopathic Medicine, Indianapolis, IN, 46222, USA