Theory and Decision

, Volume 74, Issue 1, pp 1–12

An axiomatization of the kernel for TU games through reduced game monotonicity and reduced dominance

Authors

  • Theo Driessen
    • Department of Applied Mathematics, Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer ScienceUniversity of Twente
    • Department of EconomicsNational Cheng Kung University
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11238-012-9344-1

Cite this article as:
Driessen, T. & Hu, C. Theory Decis (2013) 74: 1. doi:10.1007/s11238-012-9344-1
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Abstract

In the framework of transferable utility games, we modify the 2-person Davis–Maschler reduced game to ensure non-emptiness (NE) of the imputation set of the adapted 2-person reduced game. Based on the modification, we propose two new axioms: reduced game monotonicity (RGM) and reduced dominance (RD). Using RGM, RD, NE, Covariance under strategic equivalence, Equal treatment property and Pareto optimality, we are able to characterize the kernel.

Keywords

Cooperative gameKernelReduced gameMonotonicityDominance

JEL Classification

C71

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2012