An axiomatization of the kernel for TU games through reduced game monotonicity and reduced dominance
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- Driessen, T. & Hu, CC. Theory Decis (2013) 74: 1. doi:10.1007/s11238-012-9344-1
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In the framework of transferable utility games, we modify the 2-person Davis–Maschler reduced game to ensure non-emptiness (NE) of the imputation set of the adapted 2-person reduced game. Based on the modification, we propose two new axioms: reduced game monotonicity (RGM) and reduced dominance (RD). Using RGM, RD, NE, Covariance under strategic equivalence, Equal treatment property and Pareto optimality, we are able to characterize the kernel.