Theory and Decision

, Volume 74, Issue 1, pp 1-12

First online:

An axiomatization of the kernel for TU games through reduced game monotonicity and reduced dominance

  • Theo DriessenAffiliated withDepartment of Applied Mathematics, Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science, University of Twente
  • , Cheng-Cheng HuAffiliated withDepartment of Economics, National Cheng Kung University Email author 

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In the framework of transferable utility games, we modify the 2-person Davis–Maschler reduced game to ensure non-emptiness (NE) of the imputation set of the adapted 2-person reduced game. Based on the modification, we propose two new axioms: reduced game monotonicity (RGM) and reduced dominance (RD). Using RGM, RD, NE, Covariance under strategic equivalence, Equal treatment property and Pareto optimality, we are able to characterize the kernel.


Cooperative game Kernel Reduced game Monotonicity Dominance

JEL Classification