Theory and Decision

, Volume 71, Issue 2, pp 163–174

Differential marginality, van den Brink fairness, and the Shapley value

Authors

    • IMW Institute of Mathematical EconomicsBielefeld University
    • Chair of Economics and Information SystemsHHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management
    • Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche FakultätUniversität Leipzig
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11238-009-9171-1

Cite this article as:
Casajus, A. Theory Decis (2011) 71: 163. doi:10.1007/s11238-009-9171-1

Abstract

We revisit the characterization of the Shapley value by van den Brink (Int J Game Theory, 2001, 30:309–319) via efficiency, the Null player axiom, and some fairness axiom. In particular, we show that this characterization also works within certain classes of TU games, including the classes of superadditive and of convex games. Further, we advocate some differential version of the marginality axiom (Young, Int J Game Theory, 1985, 14: 65–72), which turns out to be equivalent to the van den Brink fairness axiom on large classes of games.

Keywords

TU game Superadditive game Additivity Solidarity Convex cone

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2009