Theory and Decision

, Volume 71, Issue 2, pp 163–174

Differential marginality, van den Brink fairness, and the Shapley value


    • IMW Institute of Mathematical EconomicsBielefeld University
    • Chair of Economics and Information SystemsHHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management
    • Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche FakultätUniversität Leipzig

DOI: 10.1007/s11238-009-9171-1

Cite this article as:
Casajus, A. Theory Decis (2011) 71: 163. doi:10.1007/s11238-009-9171-1


We revisit the characterization of the Shapley value by van den Brink (Int J Game Theory, 2001, 30:309–319) via efficiency, the Null player axiom, and some fairness axiom. In particular, we show that this characterization also works within certain classes of TU games, including the classes of superadditive and of convex games. Further, we advocate some differential version of the marginality axiom (Young, Int J Game Theory, 1985, 14: 65–72), which turns out to be equivalent to the van den Brink fairness axiom on large classes of games.


TU gameSuperadditive gameAdditivitySolidarityConvex cone

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2009