Condorcet vs. Borda in light of a dual majoritarian approach
 Eyal Baharad,
 Shmuel Nitzan
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Many voting rules and, in particular, the plurality rule and Condorcetconsistent voting rules satisfy the simplemajority decisiveness property. The problem implied by such decisiveness, namely, the universal disregard of the preferences of the minority, can be ameliorated by applying unbiased scoring rules such as the classical Borda rule, but such amelioration has a price; it implies erosion in the implementation of the widely accepted “majority principle”. Furthermore, the problems of majority decisiveness and of the erosion in the majority principle are not necessarily severe when one takes into account the likelihood of their occurrence. This paper focuses on the evaluation of the severity of the two problems, comparing simplemajoritarian voting rules that allow the decisiveness of the smallest majority larger than 1/2 and the classical Borda method of counts. Our analysis culminates in the derivation of the conditions that determine, in terms of the number of alternatives k, the number of voters n, and the relative (subjective) weight assigned to the severity of the two problems, which of these rules is superior in light of the dual majoritarian approach.
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 Title
 Condorcet vs. Borda in light of a dual majoritarian approach
 Journal

Theory and Decision
Volume 71, Issue 2 , pp 151162
 Cover Date
 20110801
 DOI
 10.1007/s112380099157z
 Print ISSN
 00405833
 Online ISSN
 15737187
 Publisher
 Springer US
 Additional Links
 Topics
 Keywords

 Majority decisiveness
 Condorcet criterion
 Erosion of majority principle
 The Borda method of counts
 Industry Sectors
 Authors

 Eyal Baharad ^{(1)}
 Shmuel Nitzan ^{(2)}
 Author Affiliations

 1. Department of Economics, University of Haifa, Haifa, 31905, Israel
 2. Department of Economics, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, 52900, Israel