Iffy predictions and proper expectations
First Online: 11 December 2013 Received: 02 October 2013 Accepted: 20 November 2013 DOI:
10.1007/s11229-013-0377-y Cite this article as: Benton, M.A. & Turri, J. Synthese (2014) 191: 1857. doi:10.1007/s11229-013-0377-y Abstract
What individuates the speech act of prediction? The standard view is that prediction is individuated by the fact that it is the unique speech act that requires future-directed content. We argue against this view and two successor views. We then lay out several other potential strategies for individuating prediction, including the sort of view we favor. We suggest that prediction is individuated normatively and has a special connection to the epistemic standards of expectation. In the process, we advocate some constraints that we think a good theory of prediction should respect.
Keywords Prediction Assertion Speech acts Epistemic norms Constitutive norms References
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