Acting for reasons, apt action, and knowledge
- Susanne Mantel
- … show all 1 hide
Purchase on Springer.com
$39.95 / €34.95 / £29.95*
Rent the article at a discountRent now
* Final gross prices may vary according to local VAT.
I argue for the view that there are important similarities between knowledge and acting for a normative reason. I interpret acting for a normative reason in terms of Sosa’s notion of an apt performance. Actions that are done for a normative reason are normatively apt actions. They are in accordance with a normative reason because of a competence to act in accordance with normative reasons. I argue that, if Sosa’s account of knowledge as apt belief is correct, this means that acting for a normative reason is in many respects similar to knowledge. In order to strengthen Sosa’s account of knowledge, I propose to supplement it with an appeal to sub-competences. This clarifies how this account can deal with certain Gettier cases, and it helps to understand how exactly acting for a normative reason is similar to apt belief.
- Alvarez, M. (2010). Kinds of reasons: An essay in the philosophy of action. Oxford: OUP. CrossRef
- Arpaly, N. (2003). Unprincipled virtue: An inquiry into moral agency. Oxford: OUP.
- Dretske, F. (1971). Conclusive reasons. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 49, 1–22. CrossRef
- Dretske, F. (1981). Knowledge and the flow of information. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Fairweather, A. (2001). Epistemic motivation. In A. Fairweather & L. Zagzebski (Eds.), Virtue epistemology (pp. 63–81). Oxford: OUP.
- Gettier, E. (1963). Is justified true belief knowledge? Analysis, 23, 121–123. CrossRef
- Greco, J. (2003). Knowledge as credit for true belief. In M. DePaul & L. Zagzebski (Eds.), Intellectual virtue: Perspectives from ethics and epistemology (pp. 111–134). Oxford: OUP. CrossRef
- Greco, J. (2010). Achieving knowledge: A virtue-theoretic account of epistemic normativity. Cambridge: CUP. CrossRef
- Hornsby, J. (2008). A disjunctive conception of acting for reasons. In A. Haddock & F. Macpherson (Eds.), Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge (pp. 244–261). Oxford: OUP.
- Hurka, T. (2001). Virtue, vice, and value. Oxford: OUP.
- Hurka, T. (2011). The best things in life: A guide to what really matters. Oxford: OUP.
- Hyman, J. (1999). How knowledge works. The Philosophical Quaterly, 49, 433–451. CrossRef
- Kant, I. (1785/6). Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp (2007)).
- Kiesewetter, B. (2011). ‘Ought’ and the perspective of the agent. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 5, 1–24.
- Lackey, J. (2007). Why we don’t deserve credit for everything we know. Synthese, 157, 345–361. CrossRef
- Markovits, J. (2010). Acting for the right reasons. Philosophical Review, 119, 201–242. CrossRef
- Pritchard, D. (2010). Anti-luck virtue epistemology. In D. Pritchard, A. Millar, & A. Haddock (Eds.), The nature and value of knowledge: Three investigations (pp. 48–65). Oxford: OUP. CrossRef
- Pritchard, D. (forthcoming). Anti-luck virtue epistemology Forthcoming in the Journal of Philosophy.
- Scanlon, T. M. (1998). What we owe to each other. Cambridge: HUP.
- Setiya, K. (2007). Reasons without rationalism. Princeton: PUP.
- Smith, M. (1994). The moral problem. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Sosa, E. (2004). Replies. In J. Greco (Ed.), Ernest Sosa and his critics (pp. 275–326). Oxford: Blackwell.
- Sosa, E. (2007). A virtue epistemology: Apt belief and reflective knowledge (Vol. I). Oxford: OUP. CrossRef
- Sosa, E. (2009). Reflective knowledge: Apt belief and reflective knowledge (Vol. II). Oxford: OUP. CrossRef
- Sosa, E. (2011). Knowing full well. Princeton: PUP.
- Stocker, M. (1979). Desiring the bad: An essay in moral psychology. The Journal of Philosophy, 76, 738–753.
- Unger, P. (1975). Ignorance: A case for scepticism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Velleman, J. D. (1992). The guise of the good. Noûs, 26, 3–26. CrossRef
- Warfield, T. A. (2005). Knowledge from falsehood. Philosophical Perspectives, 19, 405–416. CrossRef
- Williams, B. (1981). Persons, character, and morality. In B. Williams (Ed.), Moral luck (pp. 1–19). Cambridge: CUP.
- Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and its limits. Oxford: OUP.
- Zagzebski, L. (1996). Virtues of the mind. Cambridge: CUP.
- Acting for reasons, apt action, and knowledge
Volume 190, Issue 17 , pp 3865-3888
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
- Additional Links
- Acting for reasons
- Acting for a normative reason
- Gettier problem
- Apt belief
- Normative reasons
- Virtue epistemology
- Apt action
- Industry Sectors
- Susanne Mantel (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Philosophisches Institut, Universität des Saarlandes, Geb. C 5.2, R. 218.1, 66123, Saarbrücken, Germany