Does doxastic responsibility entail the ability to believe otherwise?
- Rik PeelsAffiliated withPhilosophy Department, VU University Amsterdam Email author
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Whether responsibility for actions and omissions requires the ability to do otherwise is an important issue in contemporary philosophy. However, a closely related but distinct issue, namely whether doxastic responsibility requires the ability to believe otherwise, has been largely neglected. This paper fills this remarkable lacuna by providing a defence of the thesis that doxastic responsibility entails the ability to believe otherwise. On the one hand, it is argued that the fact that unavoidability is normally an excuse counts in favour of this thesis. On the other hand, three objections against this thesis are discussed and criticized. First, one might think that what suffices for doxastic responsibility is control over or influence on certain desirable or undesirable properties of beliefs. It is argued that this objection misrepresents the issue under consideration. Second, it may be objected that the thesis is contradicted by our intuitions in doxastic analogues of Frankfurt-style scenarios. It is argued that distinguishing between belief-universals and belief-particulars helps to see why this argument fails. Third and finally, one might draw an analogy with the asymmetry thesis in ethics by arguing that even if blameworthy belief requires the ability to believe otherwise, praiseworthy belief does not. It is argued that the main arguments in favour of this presumed asymmetry are wanting, partly because they fail to distinguish between two different kinds of praiseworthiness. Finally, the author sketches three implications of the thesis that doxastic responsibility entails the ability to believe otherwise: counterfactual construals of responsible belief might be tenable, the deontological conception of epistemic justification needs revision on an important point, and there might be an important asymmetry between beliefs on the one hand and actions and many non-doxastic consequences on the other.
KeywordsAbility to believe otherwise Doxastic responsibility Excuses Frankfurt-style cases
- Does doxastic responsibility entail the ability to believe otherwise?
Volume 190, Issue 17 , pp 3651-3669
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- Springer Netherlands
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- Ability to believe otherwise
- Doxastic responsibility
- Frankfurt-style cases
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- Rik Peels (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Philosophy Department, VU University Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV, Amsterdam, The Netherlands