Children’s strategy use when playing strategic games
Purchase on Springer.com
$39.95 / €34.95 / £29.95*
Rent the article at a discountRent now
* Final gross prices may vary according to local VAT.
Strategic games require reasoning about other people’s and one’s own beliefs or intentions. Although they have clear commonalities with psychological tests of theory of mind, they are not clearly related to theory of mind tests for children between 9 and 10 years of age “Flobbe et al. J Logic Language Inform 17(4):417–442 (2008)”. We studied children’s (5–12 years of age) individual differences in how they played a strategic game by analyzing the strategies that they applied in a zero, first, and second-order reasoning task. For the zero-order task, we found two subgroups with different accuracy levels. For the first-order task, subgroups of children applied different suboptimal strategies or an optimal strategy. For the second-order task only suboptimal strategies were present. Strategy use for all tasks was related to age. The 5- and 6-year old children were additionally tested on theory of mind understanding and executive functioning. Strategy-use in these children was related to working memory, but not to theory of mind after correction for age, verbal ability and general IQ.
Supplementary Material (0)
- Carlson S. M., Moses L. J., Breton C. (2002) How specific is the relation between executive function and theory of mind? Contributions of inhibitory control and working memory. Infant and Child Development 11: 73–92 CrossRef
- Carlson S. M., Moses L. J., Claxton L. J. (2004) Individual differences in executive functioning and theory of mind: An investigation of inhibitory control and planning ability. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 87(4): 299–319 CrossRef
- Duijvenvoorde A. C. K., van Zanolie K., Rombouts S. A. R. B., Raijmakers M. E. J., Crone E. A. (2008) Evaluating the negative or valuing the positive? Neural mechanisms supporting feedback-based learning across development. The Journal of Neuroscience 28(38): 9495–9503 CrossRef
- Ericsson, K. A. (2006). The influence of experience and deliberate practice on the development of superior expert performance. In The Cambridge handbook of expertise and expert performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Flavell J. H., Green F. L., Flavell E. R. (1986) Development of knowledge about the appearance– reality distinction. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development 51(1): 242–245 CrossRef
- Flobbe L., Verbrugge R., Hendriks P., Krämer I. (2008) Children’s application of theory of mind in reasoning and language. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 17(4): 417–442 CrossRef
- Gierasimczuk, N., van der Maas, H. L. J. & Raijmakers, M. E. J. (2012). Logical and psychological analysis of deductive mastermind. In Proceedings of the 24th European summer school in logic, language and information, ESSLLI 2012 (pp. 1–13). Opole: ESSLLI.
- Gopnik A., Astington J. W. (1988) Children’s understanding of representational change and its relation to the understanding of false belief and the appearance–reality distinction. Child Development 59: 26–37 CrossRef
- Hedden T., Zhang J. (2002) What do you think I think you think? Strategic reasoning in matrix games. Cognition 85: 1–36 CrossRef
- Hogrefe G., Wimmer H. (1986) Ignorance versus false belief: A developmental lag in attribution of epistemic states. Child Development 57: 567–582 CrossRef
- Jansen B. R. J., van der Maas H. L. J. (1997) Statistical test of the rule assessment methodology by latent class analysis. Developmental Review 17: 321–357 CrossRef
- Klinkenberg S., Straatemeier M., van der Maas H. L. J. (2011) Computer adaptive practice of Maths ability using a new item response model for on the fly ability and difficulty estimation. Computers & Education 57(1–12): 1813–1824 CrossRef
- McCutcheon A.L. (1987) Latent class analysis. Sage, Newbury Park
- Meijering, B., van Rijn, H., Taatgen, N. & Verbrugge, R. (2011). Second-order theory of mind in strategic games is not that difficult. In Proceedings of the cognitive science society (pp. 2486–2491). Austin: Cognitive Science Society.
- Miller S. A. (2009) Children’s understanding of second-order mental states. Psychological Bulletin 135: 749–773 CrossRef
- Miyake A., Friedman N. P., Emerson M. J., Witzki A. H., Howerter A., Wager T. D. (2000) The unity and diversity of executive functions and their contributions to complex “frontal lobe” tasks: A latent variable analysis. Cognitive Psychology 41: 49–100 CrossRef
- Muris P., Steerneman P., Meesters C., Merckelbach H., Horselenberg R., van den Hogen T., van Dongen L. (1999) The TOM test: A new instrument for assessing theory of mind in normal children and children with pervasive developmental disorders. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders 29: 67–80 CrossRef
- Perner J., Leekam S. R., Wimmer H. (1987) Three-year-olds’ difficulty understanding false belief: Representational limitation, lack of knowledge, or pragmatic misunderstanding?. British Journal of Developmental Psychology 5: 125–137 CrossRef
- Rodgers E. M (2004) Interactions that scaffold reading performance. Journal of Literacy Research 36(4): 501–532 CrossRef
- Schwarz G. (1978) Estimating the dimension of a model. The Annals of Statistics 6(2): 461–464 CrossRef
- Siegler R. S. (1995) How does change occur: A microgenetic study of number conservation. Cognitive Psychology 28: 225–273 CrossRef
- Straatemeier M., van der Maas H. L. J., Jansen B. R. J. (2008) Children’s knowledge of the earth: A new methodological and statistical approach. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 100: 276–296 CrossRef
- Tager-Flusberg H., Sullivan K. (1994) A second look at second-order belief attribution in autism. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders 24: 577–586 CrossRef
- Verhoeven, L., & Vermeer, A. (2006). Verantwoording Taaltoets Alle Kinderen (TAK). Arnhem: Centraal Instituut voor Toetsontwikkeling.
- Visser I., Speekenbrink M. (2010) DepmixS4?: An R package for hidden Markov models. Journal of Statistical Software 36(7): 1–21
- Wellman H. M., Cross D., Watson J. (2001) Meta-analysis of theory-of-mind development: The truth about false belief. Child Development 72: 655–684 CrossRef
- Wimmer H., Perner J. (1983) Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children’s understanding of deception. Cognition 13: 103–128 CrossRef
About this Article
- Children’s strategy use when playing strategic games
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
- Additional Links
- Strategic games
- Child development
- Theory of mind
- Strategy analysis
- Industry Sectors