, Volume 190, Issue 13, pp 2547-2556

First online:

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Peer disagreement under multiple epistemic systems

  • Rogier De LangheAffiliated withTilburg Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science (TiLPS), Tilburg University Email author 


In a situation of peer disagreement, peers are usually assumed to share the same evidence. However they might not share the same evidence for the epistemic system used to process the evidence. This synchronic complication of the peer disagreement debate suggested by Goldman (In Feldman R, Warfield T (eds) (2010) Disagreement. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 187–215) is elaborated diachronically by use of a simulation. The Hegselmann–Krause model is extended to multiple epistemic systems and used to investigate the role of consensus and difference splitting in peer disagreement. I find that the very possibility of multiple epistemic systems downgrades the epistemic value of consensus and makes difference splitting a suboptimal strategy.


Peer disagreement Epistemic systems Alvin Goldman Hegselmann–Krause model Netlogo