, Volume 190, Issue 15, pp 3175–3184

Inconsistency in natural languages


DOI: 10.1007/s11229-012-0136-5

Cite this article as:
Azzouni, J. Synthese (2013) 190: 3175. doi:10.1007/s11229-012-0136-5


An argument for Trivialism, the view that natural languages are logically inconsistent, is provided that does not rely on contentious empirical assumptions about natural language terms such as “and” or “or.” Further, the view is defended against an important objection recently mounted against it by Thomas Hofweber.


TrivialismInconsistencyRegimentationCurry’s paradox

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Tufts UniversityBostonUSA