Synthese

, Volume 190, Issue 15, pp 3175–3184

Inconsistency in natural languages

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11229-012-0136-5

Cite this article as:
Azzouni, J. Synthese (2013) 190: 3175. doi:10.1007/s11229-012-0136-5

Abstract

An argument for Trivialism, the view that natural languages are logically inconsistent, is provided that does not rely on contentious empirical assumptions about natural language terms such as “and” or “or.” Further, the view is defended against an important objection recently mounted against it by Thomas Hofweber.

Keywords

TrivialismInconsistencyRegimentationCurry’s paradox

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Tufts UniversityBostonUSA