Synthese

, Volume 190, Issue 15, pp 3149–3160

A puzzle about belief updating

Authors

    • Philosophy & EconomicsUniversity of Bayreuth
Open AccessArticle

DOI: 10.1007/s11229-012-0132-9

Cite this article as:
Martini, C. Synthese (2013) 190: 3149. doi:10.1007/s11229-012-0132-9

Abstract

In recent decades much literature has been produced on disagreement; the puzzling conclusion being that epistemic disagreement is, for the most part, either impossible (e.g. Aumann (Ann Stat 4(6):1236–1239, 1976)), or at least easily resolvable (e.g. Elga (Noûs 41(3):478–502, 2007)). In this paper I show that, under certain conditions, an equally puzzling result arises: that is, disagreement cannot be rationally resolved by belief updating. I suggest a solution to the puzzle which makes use of some of the principles of Hintikka’s Socratic epistemology.

Keywords

Disagreement Consensus Epistemology of disagreement Belief updating Linear updating Equal weight view Socratic epistemology

Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2012