, Volume 190, Issue 15, pp 3149-3160

First online:

Open Access This content is freely available online to anyone, anywhere at any time.

A puzzle about belief updating

  • Carlo MartiniAffiliated withPhilosophy & Economics, University of Bayreuth Email author 


In recent decades much literature has been produced on disagreement; the puzzling conclusion being that epistemic disagreement is, for the most part, either impossible (e.g. Aumann (Ann Stat 4(6):1236–1239, 1976)), or at least easily resolvable (e.g. Elga (Noûs 41(3):478–502, 2007)). In this paper I show that, under certain conditions, an equally puzzling result arises: that is, disagreement cannot be rationally resolved by belief updating. I suggest a solution to the puzzle which makes use of some of the principles of Hintikka’s Socratic epistemology.


Disagreement Consensus Epistemology of disagreement Belief updating Linear updating Equal weight view Socratic epistemology