Martini, C. Synthese (2013) 190: 3149. doi:10.1007/s11229-012-0132-9
In recent decades much literature has been produced on disagreement; the puzzling conclusion being that epistemic disagreement is, for the most part, either impossible (e.g. Aumann (Ann Stat 4(6):1236–1239, 1976)), or at least easily resolvable (e.g. Elga (Noûs 41(3):478–502, 2007)). In this paper I show that, under certain conditions, an equally puzzling result arises: that is, disagreement cannot be rationally resolved by belief updating. I suggest a solution to the puzzle which makes use of some of the principles of Hintikka’s Socratic epistemology.
DisagreementConsensusEpistemology of disagreementBelief updatingLinear updatingEqual weight viewSocratic epistemology